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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 25, 1997, in City ofBoerne v. Flores,' the Supreme Court held the
Law Clerk, The Honorable Wm. Matthew Byrne, Jr., United States District Court, Central District
of California; Law Clerk, The Honorable M. Margaret McKeown, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 2000-01.
J.D., Yale Law School, 1999; B.A., Yale College, 1995. My thanks to Julie Becker, Paul Gewirtz, Craig
Green, Douglas Laycock, Lee Seltman and Lior Strahilevitz for their extensive and thoughtful comments, and
to Guido Calabresi and Judith Resnik for their guidance.
1
Shumsky: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Postmortem of a Failed Sta
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1999
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)2 unconstitutional.3 The Court found
that in enacting RFRA, Congress had exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power.4 Pursuant to that power, the Court held, Congress could have
constitutionally prevented states from infringing on religious free exercise as
defined by existing First Amendment jurisprudence. However, RFRA did much
more-it worked "a substantive change in the governing law."5
Congress saw the overthrow of RFRA as a disaster and immediately
sprang into action. Less than three weeks after Boerne was decided, the House held
hearings entitled Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores.6 Witness
after witness denounced Boerne; one went so far as to compare it to Dred Scott.
7
Additional hearings followed in late 1997 and early 1998,8 culminating in the
introduction of the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998 (RLPA) in the House9
and the Senate.1° The point of RLPA was clear-to reenact the religious protections
formerly embodied in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.11
1 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
3 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512.
4 See id. at 519; cf U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
5 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519; id. at 532 ("RFRA cannot be considered remedial, preventive legislation,
if those terms are to have any meaning. RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive
object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It
appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections.").
6 Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the
Const. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (July 14, 1997) (visited Oct. 26, 1998)
<http:/www.house.gov/judiciary/222302.htmn> [hereinafter July 14, 1997 Hearings].
7 See id. (statement of Rev. Oliver Thomas, Special Counsel for Religious and Civil Liberties, Nat'l
Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States), available in 1997 WL 394491.
8 See Congress' Constitutional Role in Protecting Religious Liberty: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (Oct. 1, 1997) [hereinafter Oct. 1, 1997 Hearings]; The Need for
Federal Protection of Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the
Const. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (Feb. 26, 1998) (visited Oct. 26, 1998)
<http://www.house.govfjudiciary/22373.htm>; The Need for Federal Protection of Religious Freedom After
Boerne v. Flores, II: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong. (Mar. 26, 1998) (visited Oct. 26, 1998) <http://www.house.govjudiciary/222350.htm>.
9 H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (1998).
10 S. 2148, 105th Cong. (1998).
11 See Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearings on H.R. 4019 Before the Subcomm. on the
Const. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (June 23, 1998) [hereinafter June 23, 1998
Hearings] (statement of Douglas Laycock, Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law, University of Texas
Law School) ("Section 2(a) of RLPA tracks the substantive language of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act"), available in 1998 WL 373099; Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearings on H. 4019
Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (June 16, 1998)
[hereinafter June 16, 1998 Hearings] (statement of Christopher L. Eisgruber, Professor of Law, New York
University School of Law, and Lawrence G. Sager, Robert B. McKay Professor of Law, New York
University School of Law) ("RLPA is a proposed effort to preserve what was valuable in the Religious
[Vol. 102:81
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In the rush to repair the damage supposedly wrought by Boerne, no one
stopped to ask whether RFRA in operation had actually contributed to the
protection of religious freedom.12 It would seem that this inquiry into effectiveness
should have been the threshold question-after all, if RFRA had been ineffective,
there would be little reason, other than its political appeal, to reenact it. But rather
than beginning with this question of efficacy, the hearings-and the surrounding
debate-focused almost exclusively on strategies for getting around the Court's
decision in Boerne. Some proclaimed the need for a constitutional amendment. 3
Others argued that new legislation could be justified under the Commerce Clause14
or Congress' spending power." One witness even urged Congress to challenge the
Court directly, using techniques like "stripping of appellate jurisdiction,
impeachment[, or] a 'court packing' plan like that almost pursued by President
Roosevelt in the 1930s."16 In the academic setting, too, commentators focused on
possible responses to Boerne, rather than asking whether RFRA did any good.7
This Article considers the foundational empirical question, and concludes
Freedom Restoration Act"), available in 1998 WL 318288.
12 This hasty reaction is not so surprising as it might initially seem. One author has argued that the
similarly vehement reaction to Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), may be attributed to
"inattention to how courts have actually been treating the free exercise claimant" James E. Ryan, Note,
Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REv. 1407, 1408
(1992).
13 See, e.g., Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearings on H.R. 4019 Before the Subcomm.
on the Const. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (July 14, 1998) [hereinafter July 14, 1998
Hearings] (statement of Michael P. Farris, Founder and President, Home School Legal Defense Association),
available in 1998 WL 390275; Oct. 1, 1997 Hearings, supra note 8 (statement of Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Professor, University of Minnesota Law School), available in 1997 WL 14152193; Nathan Lewin, Editorial,
It's Time for a Religious Freedom Amendment, WASH. POST, July 3, 1997, at A19 (suggesting that the
Court's treatment in Boerne of the religiously observant can be compared to a hypothetical court's
reaffirmation of"separate but equal" in the face of a national consensus on racial equality).
14 See, e.g., June 23, 1998 Hearings, supra note 11 (statement of Douglas Laycock), available in
1998 WL 373099; June 16, 1998 Hearings, supra note 11 (statement of Gene C. Schaerr), available in 1998
WL 318297; July 14, 1997 Hearings, supra note 6 (statement of Thomas C. Berg, Associate Professor,
Cumberland Law School, Samford University), available in 1997 WL 11234759. But see July 14, 1998
Hearings, supra note 13 (statement of Michael P. Farris) (arguing that RLPA "runs in direct opposition" to
the "encouraging development" in federalism embodied in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
15 See, e.g., June 23, 1998 Hearings, supra note I1 (statement of Douglas Laycock), available in
1998 WL 373099; June 16, 1998 Hearings, supra note 11 (statement of Gene C. Schaerr), available in 1998
WL 318297; July 14, 1997 Hearings, supra note 6 (statement of Thomas C. Berg), available in 1997 WL
11234759.
16 July 14, 1998 Hearings, supra note 13 (statement of Michael P. Farris).
17 See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, Congressional Alternatives in the Wake of City ofBoeme v. Flores:
The (Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom from State and Local Infringement, 20 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK LJ. 633, 645-83 (1998) (considering various alternatives, including more narrowly
tailored legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, or legislation under the Interstate Commerce
Clause, Congress' treaty power, or Congress' spending power); Robert S. Drinan, Reflections on the Demise
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 86 GEo. L.J. 101, 118-19 (1997) (same); Yehuda M. Braunstein,
Note, Will Jewish Prisoners Be Boerne Again: Legislative Responses to City of Boerne v. Flores, 66
FORDHAM L. REv. 2333, 2374-89 (1998) (considering similar alternatives and advocating state-by-state
implementation of RFRA-like legislation).
3
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that RFRA did far less than promised. Rather than functioning as the robust
protector of religious liberty that its proponents envisioned, RFRA provided only
marginally greater protection for religious free exercise than what came before. Part
I introduces RFRA; Employment Division v. Smith,18 the Supreme Court case to
which RFRA responded; and the high hopes surrounding RFRA's passage. Part II
argues that in certain categories of cases, RFRA created no new protection. Some
state constitutional provisions already protected religion at least as vigorously as
RFRA purported to. Where such state protections were available, RFRA simply
provided a further, federal remedy. In other cases-particularly in employment
discrimination suits against religious organizations-Smith never changed the
standard for free exercise analysis. Thus, RFRA could not institute a higher level of
protection, because in these areas, Smith had never lowered protection. Part III
analyzes the RFRA case law to show that few courts held for religious claimants.
Even in areas (either geographic or substantive) where RFRA could have
heightened religious protection, courts narrowly interpreted the Act in ways that
minimized its effectiveness. They applied limited constructions to all three prongs
of the compelling interest test implemented by RFRA-substantial burden on
religion, compelling government interest, and least restrictive means. In the final
calculus, even before Boerne killed RFRA, the statute had already failed to live up
to its promise.
II. EMPLOYMENT DIVISION V. SMITH, RFRA'S PASSAGE, AND HIGH HOPES
The history of RFRA forms a striking parallel to the recent debates about
RLPA. For just as RLPA is intended to undermine City ofBoerne v. Flores, RFRA
was intended to reverse Employment Division v. Smith.19 In Smith, the Supreme
Court considered the free exercise claims of Alfred Smith and Galen Black, drug
rehabilitation counselors who were fired because they used the hallucinogen
peyote20 during a ceremony of the Native American Church.21 When Smith and
Black filed for unemployment compensation, their claims were denied on the
ground that they had been fired for "work-related 'misconduct.'22
When Smith reached the Supreme Court, the Court rejected the
unemployment counselors' constitutional claims. 23 In so doing, the Court
announced and used a new test for evaluating government-imposed burdens on
religious free exercise. Since 1963, courts had applied "strict scrutiny" in cases
18 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
19 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994). For discussion of this reversal, see infra notes 30-31 and
accompanying text.
20 The buds of the peyote cactus contain mescaline, a drug with hallucinogenic effects. OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
21 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
22 Id.
23 See id. at 890.
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involving free exercise claims: If a law imposed a substantial burden on free
exercise, it could only constitutionally be justified if the law was necessary to
achieve a compelling government interest.24 However, in Smith, the Court
distinguished and limited this "compelling interest" test on the ground that it had
only ever been applied in cases involving denials of unemployment compensation
benefits.2 ' Having set aside this seemingly strong line of precedent, the Court
concluded that "an individual's religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate. 26 In short, the tables had been turned. Formerly, the government had to
prove that its interest was compelling and its policy was necessary; now, the
religious plaintiff bore the heavy burden of proving the government policy to be
altogether irrational.
The backlash against Smith was immediate. The Los Angeles Times blasted
the Court for "pure legal adventurism," railing that the decision "is more than a
sweeping repudiation of nearly a century of humane and enlightened legal
precedent. It is an affront both to our society's hard-won pluralism and to the belief
in limited government that distinguishes principled conservatism from mere
reaction."27 The legal director of the American Jewish Committee argued that Smith
would "virtually eviscerate the free exercise of religion clause of the First
Amendment."28 Congress also responded-it passed RFRA.29
24 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). This test was later refined in Thomas v. Review
Board to require that the "inroad on religious liberty [be] the least restrictive means of achieving some
compelling state interest." 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
25 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.
26 Id. at 878-79. A broad range of scholars has attacked Smith as a drastic reversal from earlier
cases. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 52 (1993)
("[Smith] dramatically altered the constitutional landscape of religious liberty"); Michael W. McConnell,
Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109 (1990).
27 The Necessity of Religion: High Court Says Religious Freedom Is a Luxury--Wrong, L.A. TIMES,
April 19, 1990, atB6.
28 Samuel Rabinove, The Supreme Court and Religious Freedom, CHIUSTiAN SCI. MONITOR, June
25, 1990, at 19.
29 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). RFRA was not
the only congressional reaction to Smith. Five months after Smith was decided, during then-Judge David
Souter's Supreme Court confirmation hearings, Senator Arlen Specter questioned him about Smith. Though
Souter resisted, he did express "the value of the strict scrutiny test," and further stated that he did not read
Sherbert v. Verner so narrowly as Justice Scalia had in Smith. Nomination of David H. Souter To Be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 156-57 (1991), reprinted in 16 RoY M. MERSKY ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 1916-1990, at 290-91 (1992). This seems to have
pleased Senator Biden, who appended Additional Views to the Committee Report in which he described
Souter's "sensitivity to the problem at the core of Smith and of modem Free Exercise Clause doctrine-the
problem of adjusting government action to religious practice in a pluralistic society." S. EXEC. REP. No. 101-
32, at 31 (1990) (additional views of Joseph Biden, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee), reprinted in
MERSKY ET AL., supra, at 1363; see also 136 CONG. REC. S14,340 (statement of Sen. Biden) ("Judge Souter
suggested that he disagreed with the Supreme Court's recent and restricted decision in Employment Division
versus Smith, a decision that in my view undermines religious freedom in our country. And again I found his
1999]
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The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was quite explicit in function. It
was intended to overturn Smith. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report states that
RFRA "responds to the Supreme Court's decision in [Smith]."30 Indeed, the text of
RFRA itself refers to Smith, noting that "in Employment Division v. Smith ... the
Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify
burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion."31 In place
of the deferential Smith standard, RFRA reinstituted the more protective
compelling interest test, employing statutory language that mirrored the former
constitutional standard. 2
Reaction to RFRA was generally positive, and often extremely so. Many
of the Act's supporters believed that RFRA would have a wide-ranging effect,
restoring religious jurisprudence to its proper course. With Thanksgiving close at
hand, some sang the praises of RFRA in almost religious terms: "In this
Thanksgiving season, Americans of every religious faith can be grateful that their
free exercise of religion is suddenly more secure than when the Supreme Court
assailed the first of our civil liberties three years ago. 33 Another writer gushed that
RFRA "is one of the most important pieces of legislation related to the freedom of
religion ever adopted by Congress. It is one thing we surely should be thankful for
this season."34 The Arizona Daily Star lauded President Clinton for signing the Act,
saying that he had "struck a blow for the religious liberty of all Americans."5 And
Oliver Thomas, former general counsel of the Baptist Joint Committee and leader
of the largest coalition that lobbied for RFRA, said that while "more than 60 cases
have been decided against religious claimants [since Smith], . . . [t]oday we
celebrate the end of this dark night."36
disagreement with that decision very encouraging."), available in 1990 WL 144327, at "12.
30 S. REP. No. 103-111, at 2 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1893; see also City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997) ("Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's
decision in [Smith].").
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (1994).
32 Id. § 2000bb-1:
(a)In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b)
of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
33 Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., A Blow for Religious Freedom, BALTIMORE EVENING SUN, Nov.
11, 1993, at 9A.
34 Cody Lowe, A Bit of Legislation for Which To Give Thanks, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS,
Nov. 28, 1993, at3.
35 Restoring Religious Freedom, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Nov. 21, 1993, at 2G.
3 David E. Anderson, Signing of Religious Freedom Act Culminates 3-Year Push, WASH. POST,
Nov. 20, 1993, at C6.
[Vol. 102:81
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Even those who opposed RFRA agreed that the Act would have a
tremendous effect. Prison administrators feared the disruption of prisons. 7 State
officials claimed that "[p]risoners could.. ., in the name of religious freedom,
compel authorities to supply them with chateaubriand and sherry and even with
civilian clothing that would make it easier for them to escape.' m8 Children's
advocacy groups hinted that religious exemptions under RFRA would mean the end
of state protections-and the beginning of wicked consequences-for children.39
And behind all of these specific fears, there loomed Justice Scalia's general
prediction of doom in Smith. In striking down the compelling interest test, Scalia
had threatened that implementing such a test would break down our very society:
[I]f "compelling interest" really means what it says ... , many
laws will not meet the test. Any society adopting such a system
would be courting anarchy .... [W]e cannot afford the luxury of
deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious
objector, ever6 regulation of conduct that does not protect an
interest of the highest order. The [compelling interest test] would
open the prospect of constitutionally required religious
exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable
kind-ranging from compulsory military service to the payment
of taxes; to health and safety regulation such as manslaughter and
child neglect laws, compulsory vaccination laws, drug laws, and
traffic laws; to social welfare legislation such as minimum wage
laws, child labor laws, animal cruelty laws, environmental
protection laws, and laws providing for equality of opportunity
for the races.40
37 See S. REP. No. 103-11i, at 25 (1993). Twenty-six state attorneys general wrote to Senator Biden
to urge an amendment exempting prisons from RFRA, see id., as did the Executive Director of the
Association of State Correctional Administrators, see id. at 35, 36.
3 William Clalbome, State Officials Hoping To Stop Bill Granting Religious Demands, BUFFALO
NEws, Aug. 7, 1993, at A3.
39 See Brief for Amici Curiae Children's Healthcare Is A Legal Duty, Inc. & Am. Prof'l Soc'y on the
Abuse of Children in Support of Petitioner, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (No. 95-2074),
available in 1996 WL 686052, at *6:
RFRA's strict scrutiny standard [limits to a single "least restrictive" remedy] children
who are in the custody of persons whose religious beliefs or practices are contrary to
commonly accepted notions of child welfare. The types of religious practices which
adversely affect child welfare include reliance on spiritual means for treatment of illness
which withholds needed medical care, physical punishment, abuse through exposure to
dangerous animals or poison, as well as child sexual practices.
40 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888-89 (1989) (citations omitted). In fairness to
Justice Scalia, his primary purpose was probably not to predict a breakdown in the rule of law. Rather, Scalia
seems to have stated his true concern in a subsequent footnote: "fl]t is horrible to contemplate that federal
judges will regularly balance against the importance of general laws the significance of religious practice."
d. at 889 n.5. Even so, Justice Scalia does seem concerned that judges might allow such anarchy-inducing
exceptions. Id. Either way, this parade of horribles is an eloquent precursor to the courts' current reluctance
to grant religious exceptions, and it continues to be echoed as a warning in articles critical of RFRA. See, e.g.,
Tania Saison, Restoring Obscurity: The Shortcomings of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 28 COLUM.
1999]
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Like the most vociferous of RFRA's proponents and opponents, Justice Scalia
apparently believed that a RFRA-style compelling interest test would have a
considerable effect. And like them, he was wrong.
But beneath these optimistic predictions and the accompanying rhetoric,
there ran a current of concern about the way in which courts would interpret RFRA.
Six Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee wrote that even the pre-Smith
strict scrutiny that RFRA sought to restore had provided little religious protection
in the courts:
In justification of the need for this legislation, proponents have
provided the Committee with long lists of cases in which free
exercise claims have failed since Smith was decided.
Unfortunately, however, even prior to Smith, it is well known that
the "compelling state interest" test had proven an unsatisfactory
means of providing protection for individuals trying to exercise
their religion in the face of government regulations. Restoration
of the pre-Smith standard, although politically practical, will
likely prove, over time, to be an insufficient remedy....
... [The Act] will perpetuate, by statute, both the benefits and
frustrations faced by religious claimants prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Smith.
41
Likewise, Douglas Laycock and Oliver Thomas, two of RFRA's primary
supporters, wrote that RFRA would only succeed in protecting religious liberty if
the courts understood RFRA to signal a jurisprudential shift: "RFRA cannot
succeed unless it changes the judicial and bureaucratic climate that Employment
Division v. Smith both reflected and aggravated. 42 In short, "The Act will fail
unless it serves as a political signal that Congress means to provide serious
protection for religious minorities-unless the compelling interest test is
reinvigorated in the lower courts. 43 If the results of RFRA cases in the lower
courts are taken as the measure of the Act, then that "political signal" was not
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 653, 655 (1995) (worrying that the compelling interest test could lead to "a flood of
exemptions from generally applicable laws [that] would threaten governmental effectiveness" and quoting
Scalia's parade of horribles).
41 H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 16-17 (1993).
42 Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73
TEX. L. REV. 209,244 (1994).
43 Id. at 224; see also Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
62 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 901:
QUESTION: How far can the Supreme Court go taking the teeth out of [RFRA] by just
watering down the compelling interest test to a point where it's so narrow that it really
doesn't mean anything?
MR. LAYCOCK: I think that's the principal danger to the bill .... There was some fear
in the Senate that judges were going to run amok and protect all sorts of crazy stuff. I
think the greater risk is that they will be highly deferential and not protect nearly
enough.
[Vol. 102:81
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received.
III. THE STATE OF THE LAW FOLLOWING EMPLOYMENTDIVISION V. SMITH A
STARTING POINT FOR EVALUATING RFRA
To determine the effectiveness of RFRA, two pieces of information are
necessary-the background protection of religious free exercise against which
RFRA was enacted, and what the statute did in fact accomplish." This Part
considers the first of those questions.
Employment Division v. Smith was the baseline from which RFRA was to
be measured. This was clear from the statutory text and the legislative history.
Thus, even if the extreme rhetoric regarding the problems with Smith is
disregarded,48 it seems clear that Smith is the proper starting point for an analysis of
RFRA. And, despite the angry criticism of Smith at the time that decision was
handed down,4 7 Smith may not have had such a negative effect as was feared. This
is not necessarily to argue that Smith did not lower the bar on religious protection.
Formally speaking it did, and symbolically it was perceived as a major blow to
religious liberty.48 However, even before Smith, the Supreme Court's religious
jurisprudence was not particularly solicitous of free exercise. 49 As Justice Scalia
44 Throughout this article, I refer to RFRA in the past tense, as though the statute were dead. And
while this is largely accurate, RFRA may still have a little life in it. Because Boerne held RFRA
unconstitutional as violative of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment powers, see 521 U.S. at 529-36, some
courts have reasoned that RFRA remains in effect for suits against federal government officials, see, e.g.,
Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 141 F.3d 854, 858-59 (8th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 43 (1998). But see Patel v. United States, 132 F.3d 43, 1997 WL 764570, at *2 (10th Cir.
1997) (unpublished table decision; text available in Westlaw) (reaching the opposite conclusion).
45 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
46 It is important to recognize that statements made during legislative hearings should not always be
taken at face value. Proponents of legislation-both witnesses and legislators-have great incentive to
bluster. Exaggeration may help to convince marginal legislators to support the legislation, and it may build
support among voters, who will in turn pressure their legislators to support the legislation. See generally Reed
Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History, 11 HoFSTRA L. REv. 1125, 1131
(1983) (arguing that committee hearings should be disregarded because they have no adversarial component,
and are stacked heavily in favor of the bill at issue).
47 See supra hotes 27-29 and accompanying text.
48 See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 42, at 216 ('The formal doctrine [contained in Smith]was bad
enough, but the symbolic effect was worse. Government bureaucrats, their lawyers, and many lower court
judges took Smith as a signal that the Free Exercise Clause had been generally repealed, that whatever clever
argument a church lawyer might make about Smith's exceptions, the operative rule was that free exercise
claims should be rejected."); see also Steven D. Smith, Losing Jerusalem-RFRA and the Vocation of Legal
Crusader, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 907, 919 ("In retrospect, it seems that the Sherbert v. Verner
'compelling state interest' doctrine was for many religious believers a prize to be fought for and defended. So
Smith represented, in effect, the loss of Jerusalem, to be retaken (temporarily as it turned out) by the
enactment of RFRA." (footnotes omitted)).
49 See Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REv. 1, 3 (1994) ("While the Court had continued to advert to the
'compelling interest' language before Smith, suggesting a highly protective attitude toward religion, its actual
decisions had grown more and more deferential to the government. A statute that simply turns the clock back
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noted in Smith, "We have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis
of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compensation. Although we
have sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test in contexts other than that, we
have always found the test satisfied.'' 50 Indeed, one commentator who catalogued
free exercise cases from 1980 to 1990 found that free exercise claimants lost 85 of
the 97 free exercise cases decided by appeals courts during that period.5 ' Thus, it
seems that the courts guarded free exercise only minimally, even under the
supposedly protective Sherbert standard.
Moreover, at least among reported cases, it appears that Smith caused less
damage than was feared. The same author who catalogued the courts' pre-Smith
jurisprudence analyzed the cases in which free exercise claims were successful. He
concluded that, of the twelve cases won by free exercise claimants, only one or two
would have been decided differently under the more restrictive Smith standard. 2
This, then, is a problem of baselines. Contrary to the rhetoric surrounding RFRA,
the law before Smith was not very protective of religion, and the law after Smith
was not a significant change. Thus, a restoration through RFRA of the status quo
ante would likely have correspondingly little effect.
A. Religious Employers-RFRA Safeguarded What Already Was Protected
In certain categories of cases, RFRA could not "restore" religious
protection because Smith had never lowered the standard. Certain kinds of free
exercise were guarded even under Smith. This does not demonstrate, of course, that
RFRA was a failure. Rather, it simply shows that Smith was not the across-the-
board limitation on free exercise that some feared. As such, RFRA was not the
cure-all that some claimed.
The most obvious example of religious protection that remained in place
even after Smith occurred in cases involving religiously motivated denials of
unemployment benefits. This was the context in which Sherbert v. Verner first
established the strict scrutiny standard,5 it was bolstered by three later Supreme
Court decisions,4 and it was seemingly left undisturbed by the otherwise across-
to the day before Smith might not 'restore' very much in the way of religious freedom." (footnote omitted));
see also Ira C. Lupu, Why the Congress Was Wrong and the Court Was Right-Reflections on City of Boeme
v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 793, 801 (1998) ("the pre-Smith law of free exercise had not been very
favorable to religion").
50 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1989). "Sherbert" refers here to Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), in which the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to government burdens on
free exercise. Cf supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
51 See Ryan, supra note 12, at 1417', see also Berg, supra note 49, at 10-12 (discussing cases).
52 See Ryan, supra note 12, at 1417, 1429-34.
53 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
54 See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707
(1981).
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the-board rule announced in Smith.i9 But beyond this one exception carved out by
Smith itself, there were other areas of religious practice that were recognized as
special even before Smith, and that remained largely unaffected by Smith.
This occurred, for instance, in the context of employment discrimination or
wrongful termination lawsuits against religious employers. While these suits most
obviously implicated the Establishment Clause (because of the potential for
excessive government entanglement with internal church governance),s6 they also
raised substantial free exercise concerns. After all, to freely exercise their religion,
churches must be able to select their spiritual leaders. The Fourth Circuit
recognized this in the pre-Smith case of Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-
day Adventists.5' Rayburn had been denied a position as an Adventist associate
pastor, and sued under Title VII for racial and gender discrimination.'e Although
the court believed that Congress did intend Title VII to govern cases like this one, it
held that applying Title VII here would substantially burden free exercise:
The right to choose ministers without government restriction
underlies the well-being of religious community, for perpetuation
of a church's existence may depend upon those whom it selects to
preach its values, teach its message, and interpret its doctrines...
. Any attempt by government to restrict a church's free choice of
its leaders thus constitutes a burden on the church's free exercise
rights.5 9
Having found a substantial burden, the court then applied a balancing test,
weighing the church's free exercise right against the government's interest in
prohibiting discrimination. It found that the balance of these factors favored the
church,6' and affirmed summary judgment in its favor.61
55 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-84. Like the other cases noted above, Smith involved the denial of
unemployment benefits. However, because the plaintiffs' benefits were terminated for drug use, the majority
treated this as a case about generally applicable criminal laws, rather than unemployment benefits. See id at
884-85.
56 See, e.g., Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th
Cir. 1985) ("To subject church employment decisions [regarding employees with spiritual functions] to Title
VII scrutiny would... give rise to 'excessive government entanglement' with religious institutions prohibited
by the establishment clause of the First Amendment." (citation omitted)).
57 See id at 1167-69.
58 See id at 1165.
59 Id at 1167-68 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
60 See id at 1169 ("While an unfettered church choice may create minimal infidelity to the objectives
of Title VII, it provides maximum protection of the First Amendment right to the free exercise of religious
beliefs. The balance of values thus weighs against Rayburn's suggestionthat the government may question
the decision of the Seventh-day Adventist Church to hire another candidate as an associate in pastoral care.").
However, the court did limit this exemption from Title VII to cases "involv[ing] the church's spiritual
functions." Id at 1171.
61 See id at 1165.
1999]
11
Shumsky: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Postmortem of a Failed Sta
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1999
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
This "ministerial exception," 2 established under pre-Smith strict scrutiny,
was later followed in a range of cases under the analogous RFRA standard. For
instance, in Powell v. Stafford,63 a federal district court held that applying the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act to the employment decisions of a Catholic high
school would substantially burden the free exercise of the Archdiocese. 64 Likewise,
in Porth v. Roman Catholic Diocese,6s the ministerial exception was held to bar a
suit brought under Michigan law by a teacher fired from a Catholic high school
because she was Protestant.66 Applying strict scrutiny, the court found "no interest,
and certainly no compelling interest, in requiring church-operated schools to
employ teachers of other faiths or of no faith." 7 And in EEOC v. Catholic
University of America,68 the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a Title VII
gender discrimination claim brought by a nun who taught at Catholic University.69
The court followed the analysis employed in Powell and Porth, then pointed to
Rayburn to hold that the ministerial exception precluded application of Title VII.
70
In addition to applying the ministerial exception under RFRA, the D.C.
Circuit also held that the doctrine remained valid under the First Amendment, even
after Smith.71 In so doing, it suggested two significant exceptions to Smith. First,
the court reasoned that the Sherbert/Smith axis of cases may not govern all free
exercise claims. For while some ministerial exception cases had employed the
compelling interest test, the court suggested that there existed a separate, relevant
line of precedent in which the Supreme Court avoided traditional tiers of scrutiny in
favor of a more direct consideration of church autonomy.72 The court believed that
these cases represent a "century-old affirmation of a church's sovereignty over its
own affairs. 73 In discussing these cases, the court departed altogether from
traditional free exercise and establishment analysis, pointing instead to the courts'
general unsuitability to decide who should lead a church.74 This, too, suggests a
limitation in RFRA's application. If certain free exercise claims can be decided
62 EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455,461 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
63 859 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Colo. 1994).
64 See id. at 1347.
65 532 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
66 See id. at 197.
67 Id. at 200.
68 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
69 See id. at 457.
70 See id. at 461-65.
71 See id. at 462.
72 See id. at 462-63.
73 Id. at 463.
74 See id. at 462-63.
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apart from the usual strict scrutiny or minimal scrutiny tests, then the passage of
RFRA may not have affected the outcome of these claims.
Second, the court held that even if Smith did apply, this case fell within the
"hybrid rights" exception discussed in Smith." For although Smith had overturned
strict scrutiny in most free exercise cases, it retained the compelling interest test in
cases where "[the] application of a neutral, generally applicable law..., involved
not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction
with other constitutional protections."78 The court found that just such a hybrid
right exists in the case of the ministerial exception, where both Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause concerns are at issue.
7
It is as yet unclear how broadly the hybrid rights exception will be
construed. Some commentators have rejected the exception as so broad that it
would overwhelm Smith, and therefore functionally meaningless.78 So, too, have
some courts.79 On the other hand, some circuits have begun to develop standards
for implementing this test, requiring that the plaintiff make a "colorable claim" of a
constitutional violation in addition to free exercise. In the end, it remains clear
that "hybrid rights" is an amorphous term that invites broad judicial application. So
despite the above-noted doubts, it is unsurprising that at least three courts have
used this exception to invalidate neutral laws of general applicability. 81
Taken together, these observations suggest that even under Smith-and
therefore regardless of RFRA-the church's free exercise would have been
protected. Either Smith would not have applied, and heightened free exercise
75 Id. at 467.
76 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
77 See Catholic University, 83 F3d at 467 ('Title VII would both burden Catholic University's right
of free exercise and excessively entangle the Government in religion.").
78 See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 42, at 214-15 ("The hybrid rights exception, which purported
to protect free exercise in association with some other constitutional right (such as speech or association), has
been rejected precisely because it had the potential to swallow the rule.").
79 See Kissinger v. Board of Trustees of the Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993)
(referring to the hybrid rights exception as "completely illogical;" refusing to apply it without further
direction from the Supreme Court); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeab, 508
U.S. 520, 567 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part) (describing the hybrid rights exception as "ultimately
untenable": "If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, then the
hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith rule . .
8o See Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999); Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist.,
135 F.3d 694,700 (10th Cir. 1998).
81 See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.) (invalidating an
Alaskan statute that prohibited housing discrimination on the basis of marital status; reasoning that the
plaintiffs, Christian landlords who refused to rent to unmarried couples, had presented colorable claims that
the statute was a Fifth Amendment "taking" and a violation of their First Amendment speech right to make
statements or inquiries about marital status), reh'g en banc granted & opinion withdrawn, 192 F3d 1208 (9th
Cir. 1999); People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 129 (Mich. 1993) (invalidating a Michigan statute that
required teacher certification, but only as applied to families with religious objections; finding violations of
free exercise and the religious parents' right to direct their children's education); First Covenant Church v.
City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992) (en banc). First Covenant Church is discussed in greater detail
infra in the text accompanying notes 88-96.
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protection would therefore have been appropriate, or Smith would have applied, but
the case would have fallen under the exception for hybrid rights. Thus, regardless
of whether other areas of free exercise fluctuated-and regardless of how much
they did-the Catholic University logic suggests that the ministerial exception
remained constant.
Curiously, Catholic University never discusses the fact that, just as this
analysis would predict, at least one court did uphold the ministerial exception
during the Smith period. In Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian
Hospitals,82 heard and decided in 1991, the Eighth Circuit ruled that considering
age or gender discrimination charges against a religious employer would violate the
Free Exercise Clause.' These cases suggest that, in the area of the ministerial
exception, RFRA provided no protection that was not already available.
B. RFRA Did Not Matter Where It Did Not Raise the Bar - A Federalist
Observation
A second limitation on the damage caused by Smith-and hence, the
potential efficacy of RFRA-was the existence of alternate protections in the
states. The proponents of RFRA argued that the statute was necessary to prevent
Smith from upsetting the country's religious jurisprudence. This argument,
however, ignored the fact that many states already guaranteed a level of religious
protection at least as high as that instituted by RFRA. This is the same problem of
baselines noted above. 4 As with the exceptions to Smith described in Catholic
University, the baseline of protection for religious claims in certain states remained
constant.
Reliance on state constitutional law has a long historical pedigree. It is the
sort of result envisioned by Justice Brandeis when he observed that "[it is one of
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory."' This states-qua-laboratories observation
was turned to the service of pivil liberties in the 1970s and 1980s. Under the
pressure of Burger Court conservatism, civil liberties advocates argued that state
courts should be the forum for a renewed protection of individual rights. Justice
Brennan, one of the primary advocates of this "New Judicial Federalism," noted
82 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991).
83 See id. at 363; see also Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 950-51 (3d Cir. 1991) (construing broadly
Title VII's exemption for religious employers from discrimination suits, and affirming summary judgment for
the Archdiocese of Pittsburgh on that ground; further noting that "constitutional concerns ... would be raised
by a contrary interpretation"). Note that a number of courts did apply antidiscrimination laws against
religious employers during the Smith period. However, they did so only when the plaintiff did not have
religious duties, a circumstance that would likely permit the application of antidiscrimination law even under
strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 328, 331 (3d
Cir. 1993) (remanding to allow investigation of ADEA claims; declining to decide whether Smith modifies
the ministerial exception).
84 See supra text accompanying notes 45-52.
85 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,386-87 (1932).
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that "federal preservation of civil liberties is a minimum, which the states may
surpass so long as there is no clash with federal law. ' " Thus, he concluded that
"[t]his rebirth of interest in state constitutional law should be greeted with equal
enthusiasm by all those who support our federal system." 1
Just such a reinvigoration of religious civil liberties occurred in state courts
in the wake of the Smith decision. As federal courts formally lowered protection for
religious free exercise, protection remained constant in many state courts. A
striking example of this turn to state constitutions occurred in First Covenant
Church v. City of Seattle. In that case, the Washington Supreme Court considered
a church's free exercise challenge to a city zoning ordinance.89 The court had
previously held for the church, applying strict scrutiny under Sherbert, but the
United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded for "'further consideration in
light of [Smith]."9"
On remand, the Washington Supreme Court reinstated its previous
decision, again holding for the church. It first did so under the Federal Free
Exercise Clause.91 The court went through legal contortions to distinguish Smith,
reaching the somewhat odd conclusion that this was a "hybrid rights" case in which
the compelling interest test continued to apply.92 The Washington court then
insulated itself from review by ruling for the church under the Washington
Constitution.93 Hearkening back to Brennan and Brandeis, the court noted that
"Washington, like all the states, may provide greater protection for individual
rights, based on its 'sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual
8 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as
Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548 (1986) [hereinafter Brennan, The Bill of Rights
and the States]. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., Foreward, Symposium on the Revolution in State
Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REV. 11 (1988); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protections of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977).
For a discussion by aNew York Court of Appeals judge who has been an important participant in
the New Judicial Federalism, see Judith Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice & Principle, 61 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 399 (1987). See generally Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional
Rights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1324 (1982); Symposium on the Revolution in State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L.
REV. 11 (1988); Symposium, The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959 (1985).
87 Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States, supra note 86, at 550.
88 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992) (en banc).
89 See id. at 188-89.
90 Id at 178 (quoting First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 499 U.S. 901 (1991)).
91 See id at 185.
92 See id at 179-82. This is a further example of the broad applicability of the "hybrid rights"
exception. Cf supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text. The court held that this was a case of "hybrid
rights" because two constitutional rights were at stake: free exercise and free speech. Free speech was
involved, the court reasoned, because the city zoning ordinance regulated the exterior appearance of the
church: "when the State controls the architectural 'proclamation' of religious belief inherent in its church's
exterior it effectively burdens religious speech." 840 P.2d at 182.
93 See generally Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) ("If the state court decision indicates
clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent [state]
grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision.").
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liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution."'" The
court then compared the state and federal constitutions, and concluded: "Our state
constitutional and common law history support a broader reading of [the
Washington Constitution], than of the First Amendment."95 As such, it applied a
compelling interest test and upheld the statute.9 So during the pre-RFRA period
when Smith governed, the Washington Constitution provided greater protection
than the Federal Constitution.
Other states went even further. In State v. Hershberger,97 the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the Minnesota Constitution protects free exercise more
than the Federal Constitution under Smith, but also more than the Federal
Constitution under pre-Smith strict scrutiny.98 In Hershberger, the Minnesota
Supreme Court considered the claims of Amish drivers who refused to use the
standard slow-moving vehicle (SMV) signs on their horse-drawn buggies,
preferring instead to use white reflective tape and lighted red lantems.99 Much like
the Washington Supreme Court in First Covenant Church, the Minnesota court had
previously upheld the adherents' claims under the Federal Constitution, 100 but that
determination was vacated by the Supreme Court after Smith. °10 On remand, the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that, despite lessened federal protection for
religion, the Minnesota Constitution still protected the Amish:
It is unnecessary to rest our decision on the uncertain meaning of
Smith II when the Minnesota Constitution alone provides an
independent and adequate state constitutional basis on which to
decide.
Th[e] language [in article I, section 16 of the Minnesota
Constitution] is of a distinctively stronger character than the
federal counterpart .... Whereas the first amendment establishes
a limit on government action at the point of prohibiting the
exercise of religion, section 16 precludes even an infringement on
94 840 P.2d at 185 (quoting State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986)).
95 Id. at 186. See generally WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 11:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief, and
worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested or
disturbed in person or property on account of religion; but the liberty of conscience
hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify
practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state.
98 See 840 P.2d at 189.
97 444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1989), vacated, 495 U.S. 901 (1990), on remand, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn.
1990).
98 See 462 N.W.2d at 397.
99 See 444 N.W.2d at 289.
100 See id
See Minnesota v. Hershberger, 495 U.S. 901 (1990).
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or an interference with religious freedom. 0 2
The Minnesota Supreme Court then went on to conclude that the
Minnesota Constitution protected free exercise even more stringently than pre-
Smith federal strict scrutiny. To that end, it stated a highly protective free exercise
test under Minnesota law:
Only the government's interest in peace or safety or against acts
of licentiousness will excuse an imposition on religious freedom
under the Minnesota Constitution. Conversely, the free exercise
clause of the first amendment has been interpreted to allow varied
government interests to justify such an imposition. Because
section 16 precludes an infringement on or an interference with
religious freedom and limits the permissible countervailing
interests of the government, Minnesotans are afforded greater
protection for religious liberties against governmental action
under the state constitution than under the first amendment of the
federal constitution. "
Though this decision spoke of Smith, it had implications for RFRA. For if the
Minnesota free exercise standard provided greater protection than pre-Smith strict
scrutiny, it must also have been more protective than RFRA.'0
4
Perhaps most significantly, this reliance on state law extended even into
the RFRA period. On facts strikingly similar to Hershberger, a Wisconsin court
reached a similar result in a case decided after the passage of RFRA.' ° Like the
Minnesota court, the Wisconsin Supreme Court chose to decide the case under its
state constitution." Indeed, the court explicitly declined to rely on RFRA. °7 In so
doing, the court reaffirmed the compelling interest test in Wisconsin state
jurisprudence: "We conclude that the guarantees of our state constitution will best
be furthered through continued use of the compelling interest/least restrictive
alternative analysis of free conscience claims and see no need to depart from this
102 462 N.W.2d at 396-97.
103 I at 397 (citations omitted).
104 See S. REp. No. 103-111, at 8 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1893, 1898 ("The [Senate
Judiciary Committee] expects that the courts will look to free exercise cases decided prior to Smith for
guidance in determining whether the free exercise of religion has been substantially burdened .... ").
105 See State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235 (Wis. 1996).
106 See id at 238 ("[O]ur holding in this case is based on the protections embodied in Art. I, § 18 of
the Wisconsin Constitution.") (internal citation omitted).
107 See id at 240 n.9 ("Because we conclude that the statutory requirement for display of the SMV
symbol violates this state's guarantee of freedom of conscience, we need not further address the federal issues
raised in this appeal. Specifically, we do not reach the issue of the constitutionality or applicability of
RFRA").
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time-tested standard."1"8 On that basis, the court upheld the right of Amish drivers
to substitute white reflective tape and red lanterns for the red and yellow SMV
symbol.109
So in states with significant constitutional guarantees of free exercise-and
Minnesota and Wisconsin are hardly the only such states1 '--RFRA provided a
belt-and-suspenders approach to religious liberty, simply adding federal protection
where state protection already existed. Of course, the experience of this handful of
states does not prove that RFRA had no effect. In fact, commentators have noted
that a few states have interpreted their state constitutions to follow Smith, even in
states where the constitution had previously been interpreted to mirror Sherbert.1
On the other hand, there is evidence that the dominant trend in the states was and is
in the direction of religious protection.' 12 In addition to the six states noted
above,113 four other states have implicitly or explicitly rejected the Smith
approach,1 14 eight states have passed their own statutory or constitutional versions
of RFRA,11s and about a dozen more state legislatures are considering such bills.116
RFRA's supporters perceived the statute to be a national solution to a national
108 Id. at 241.
109 See id. at 242.
110 For instance, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ignored the First Amendment
altogether in upholding a challenge to the designation of a church as a historical landmark. See Society of
Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571, 573 (Mass. 1990) (interpreting pt. 1, art. II of the
Massachusetts Constitution far more broadly than the Federal Constitution). Likewise, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine interpreted the Maine Constitution to require the government to demonstrate a compelling
public interest and no less restrictive means of achieving that interest, although the court did reserve the issue
of whether Maine's free exercise guarantee should follow Smith. See Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63,
65 n.3 (Me. 1992); see also State v. Evans, 796 P.2d 178, 179 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting KAN. CoNsT.
BILL OF RIGHTS § 7):
The right to worship God according to the dictates of conscience shall never be
infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to attend or support any form of worship;
nor shall any control of or interference with the rights of conscience be permitted, nor
any preference be given by law to any religious establishment or mode of worship.
See Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerging
Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REv. 275, 307-09 (1993) (positing a trend toward greater protection
of religion through state constitutions, but noting that Oregon and Vermont have followed Smith in their
interpretation of state constitutional provisions); Tracey Levy, Rediscovering Rights: State Courts Reconsider
the Free Exercise Clauses of Their Own Constitutions in the Wake of Employment Division v. Smith, 67
TEMP. L. REV. 1017, 1033-35 (1994) (presenting a similar thesis; noting the case of Tennessee).
112 Indeed, one commentator has suggested that RFRA hindered this process. See Lupu, supra note
49, at 808 n.74.
113 See supra note 110 and text accompanying notes 88-109.
114 See Daniel A. Crane, Beyond RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion Comes ofAge in the State Courts,
10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 235,245.46 (1998) (Vermont, Alaska, Nebraska, Montana).
115 See Council on Religious Freedom (last visited Feb. 24, 2000) <http'//www.c-r-forg/states.htn>
(Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Rhode Island, South Carolina and Texas).
116 See Council on Religious Freedom (last visited Feb. 24, 2000) <http://www.c-r-
forg/ST/RFRA.htm> (Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Virginia).
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problem, but the above-discussed cases suggest that the problem may not have been
so national or so severe.
C. Conclusions-Redundancy
The preceding discussion suggests that if RFRA were interpreted like the
pre-Smith compelling interest test, it might not have added significant protection of
religious liberty. This is because in certain areas of litigation, Smith may not have
been much worse than the compelling interest test that preceded it. State court
protections took up some of the slack; in other areas, Smith created no additional
burdens.
However, it is important not to take this argument for more than it is. In
many areas, Smith did heighten burdens on religious free exercise, because the
alternate free exercise protections discussed above are not a perfect substitute for
federal strict scrutiny. State protections were not always so expansive as the
compelling interest test, nor is it certain that they always provided identical
remedies. Indeed, the very fact that cases were decided under the Smith standardl"
strongly suggests that the state protections (and alternate doctrines) discussed
above did not take the place of the pre-Smith strict scrutiny standard. If these
substitutes had maintained protection at the pre-Smith level, those cases would not
have been decided under the lower Smith standard.
This leads to perhaps the central question of RFRA: What did it actually
accomplish? After all, RFRA was meant to reinvigorate free exercise jurisprudence.
Rather than simply reinstating the compelling interest test as it was interpreted
before Smith, certain of RFRA's most prominent supporters hoped to institute the
compelling interest test as they thought it should properly be interpreted.118 More
ambitious still, they hoped that the statute would inspire renewed vigor in the
protection of religious free exercise. Just as they believed Smith to have been a
symbolic blow to religious liberty," 9 they hoped that RFRA would signal the
importance of religious free exercise:
The lopsided votes in both houses of Congress should send a
strong message to the judiciary that accommodating religious
exercise is important. Moreover, the support of sixty-six national
religious and civil liberties groups, ranging across the spectrum
from conservative to liberal, should lend considerable clout to
those who challenge governmental interference with religious
exercise.
117 See A Bill To Protect the Free Exercise of Religion: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 50 (1992) (listing cases that had relied on Smith as of June 15, 1992).
118 See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 42, at 227 ("[F]ree exercise claims were losing--even in the
Supreme Court and even before Smith-because the cases leading up to Smith were not decided under the
compelling interest test at all."); id. at 230 ("Of course, the argument remains that some [pre-Smith] cases in
which no burden was found were wrongly decided under the [compelling interest test].").
119 Seei aat216.
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RFRA is not a mere technical change from Smith. Rather, it
restores a fundamentally different vision of human liberty.120
Indeed, this symbolic function was not just a goal of RFRA; it was the statute's
sine qua non: "RFRA cannot succeed unless it changes the judicial and
bureaucratic climate that Employment Division v. Smith both reflected and
aggravated.' ' 121 As such, to determine whether RFRA met its goals, it is necessary
to look at the courts' interpretation of RFRA. The following analysis of the RFRA
case law suggests that the courts did not receive this symbolic message.
IV. THE LIMITED INTERPRETATION OF RFRA
A. Introduction-The Structure of the Problem
In order to evaluate RFRA's results, it is necessary to look at the cases-
unlike those discussed in the preceding section-in which the new RFRA standard
was applied. And, despite the above-noted limitations on RFRA's implementation,
RFRA was substantially litigated. At the time the Supreme Court decided Boerne,
at least 250 cases had been decided under RFRA that were either officially
reported, or unpublished but available on Westlaw.1 22 These cases included over
270 distinct RFRA claims,123 about seventy of which were decided in favor of the
religious claimant. However, of those seventy claims, approximately forty were
denials of the government's motion to dismiss or motion for judgment as a matter
of law-they were not substantive rulings for a claim of religious liberty. And in
several cases, despite substantive rulings for the religious practitioner, recovery
was barred on the ground of qualified immunity.1 24 In short, fewer than one in six
RFRA claims resulted in a remediable judgment for the religious practitioner.
120 Id. at 244.
121 Id. (footnote omitted).
122 Search of Westlaw, ALLCASES Database for records containing the terms "Religious Freedom
Restoration Act" or "RFRA," but not "Right for Response Action" or "Request for Response Action" (June
1997). Such a search produced about 450 cases, many of which refer to RFRA but have no RFRA cause of
action; others of which were decided on grounds other than RFRA; and still others of which merely discuss
RFRA's constitutionality. When a decision was affirmed or dismissed in a later reported case, the different
dispositions are counted as one case.
123 Particularly within the context of prison litigation, one case often included several different
claims. For instance, in Diaz v. Collins, 872 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Tex. 1994), affd, 114 F.3d 69 (5th Cir.
1997), an American Indian prisoner claimed that his free exercise had been burdened because 1) he was not
allowed to grow his hair long; 2) he was limited in his ability to acquire a medicine pouch; and 3) he was
limited in his ability to wear a religious headband.
124 This occurred largely in prison litigation. In the typical scenario, injunctive relief was barred
because the prisoner had been transferred to another prison, and the prison officials were protected by
qualified immunity because the court found that the law surrounding RFRA was not firmly established at the
time they took the actions in controversy. See, e.g., Craddick v. Duckworth, 113 F.3d 83, 85 (7th Cir. 1997);
Show v. Patterson, 955 F. Supp. 182, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Owen v. Horsely, No. C-95-4516 EFL, 1996 WL
478960, at *24 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 1996); Woods v. Evatt, 876 F. Supp. 756, 771-72 (D.S.C. 1995), aft'd, 68
F.3d 463 (4th Cir. 1995).
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On the surface, these numbers suggest a gap between the promise of
RFRA and its actuality. Of course, other explanations are possible. First, these
numbers can only provide a rough guess at what happened in the courts. It is
possible that many RFRA claims were unreported, and it is impossible to know
whether the unreported claims were decided in similar fashion to the reported
cases. If anything, however, it stands to reason that the unreported cases were
skewed even more heavily against religious claimants, because the rejection of a
religious claim that would also have been denied under Smith seems generally less
printworthy than novel religious protection under recent legislation.12
Second, this methodology cannot account for RFRA's effect on the
government's willingness to accommodate religion, nor for its willingness to settle
free exercise claims on terms more favorable to religious plaintiffs. In civil
litigation generally, the vast majority of cases settle before trial.126 If that pattern
holds true for free exercise claims, then reported cases tell only part of the story.
While it is impossible to state a definitive conclusion about RFRA's effect on
accommodation or settlement in the absence of an extensive survey of court
dockets, a tentative prediction seems safe. It stands to reason that the passage of
RFRA and the re-implementation of strict scrutiny would initially lead to more
favorable treatment of religious claimants. In some cases, religious claimants and
their attorneys would claim likely victory under RFRA's protective language where
they could not have under Smith, and this stronger claim would likely lead to more
favorable settlements.1 27 However, if it is true - as I argue below - that the RFRA
case law was less protective than initially hoped, then claimants and government
attorneys would adjust their predictions of likely trial outcomes accordingly, and
the effect of RFRA on accommodation and settlement would be tempered.
Finally, it is possible that the low number of victories for religious
claimants was the proper result because many or most of these claims were
frivolous or unmeritorious and the courts properly weeded them out. In a few cases,
this was certainly true. For instance, it is hard to imagine that Congress intended
RFRA to allow the president of the Israel Zion Coptic Church to bring forty pounds
of marijuana across the border from Mexico in the trunk of his car, regardless of the
drug's value as a religious sacrament.1 28 But this was neither the usual case nor the
125 See Letter from Tristi J. Wilson, West Group Director of Judicial Relations (Aug. 1999) (writing
that judicial opinions should be published, inter alia, when "dealing with issues of first impression" or
"establishing, altering, modifying or explaining a rule of law") (on file with author).
126 Estimates of settlement rates vary, but most agree that well over half of all cases settle. Even Marc
Galanter and Mia Cahill, who dispute the "oft-cited figures estimating settlement rates of between 85 and 95
percent," agree that about two-thirds of cases settle. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle".
Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339, 1339 (1994).
127 See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 42, at 244 ("Bureaucrats may be more likely to accommodate
religious exercise when they know that a federal statute requires them to do so in most cases, and by giving
religious claimants the bargaining leverage of a viable claim in court, RFRA encourages out-of-court
settlements.").
128 See People v. Peck, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). In evaluating the outcomes of the
RFRA cases, it is important to recognize that there are a number of cases in which the plaintiffs lost, and
where they would almost certainly have lost under any free exercise analysis that has ever been applied by the
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typical problem. In most cases, the religious practice was - often by stipulation -
important and sincerely held, and did not contravene a government interest
perceived to be compelling so obviously as does drug smuggling. Consider the
cases of the American Indian who needs feathers for religious ceremonies and kills
protected golden eagles to obtain them;129 the Amish man, hunting on his father's
private land, who objects to wearing blaze orange because it is worldly and
ostentatious; 130 or the Muslim inmate who changes his name and believes that the
prison's use of his old name violates his faith.131 In each of these cases, the court
held that there was no RFRA violation. The question remains: Why did RFRA not
protect more claims of religious free exercise?
The answer lies in the structure of the compelling interest test. As set forth
in the statute, the test requires that:
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to
the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
132
So to consider a RFRA claim, the court had to make three determinations. First,
was the adherent's religious exercise substantially burdened? Second, if the burden
was substantial, did the government have a compelling interest that justified the
infringement? Finally, even if there was such a compelling interest, did the
government accomplish it through the least restrictive means?
These three questions granted courts tremendous interpretive leeway. In
answering them, courts favored interpretive schemes that provided only limited
protection for free exercise. To find a substantial burden, courts frequently
demanded that a religious practice was forbidden by the government - as opposed
to merely burdened - and that the practice was required by or central to the
religion, not merely a part of it. In applying the compelling interest test, courts
tended to define the government interest in the broadest possible terms. In other
cases, courts gave great deference to interests defined by government actors
themselves. Finally, courts proved unwilling to apply the least restrictive means
courts. See, e.g., Storm v. Town of Woodstock, N.Y., 944 F. Supp. 139, 146 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding no
substantial burden on the free exercise of town residents who challenged a regulation that forced them to park
one-half mile from the Magic Meadow where they celebrated full moon gatherings); Padilla v. South
Harrison R-I1 Sch. Dist., No. 94-6208-CV-SJ-6, 1995 WL 244405, at *1, *5 n.10 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 25, 1995)
(finding no substantial burden on the free exercise of a high school teacher who was dismissed for answering
affirmatively when asked whether it is ever appropriate for a teacher to have a sexual relationship with a
minor).
129 See, e.g., United States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375, 1377 (9th Cir. 1997).
130 See State v. Bontrager, No. 6-95-17, 1996 WL 612374, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 18, 1996),
dismissed & appeal denied, 675 N.E.2d 1250 (Ohio 1997).
131 See, e.g., Fawaad v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1084 (11 th Cir. 1996).
132 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (1994).
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criterion or, when they did, concluded that the policy allowed for no possible
exceptions, thereby severely undermining that part of the test.
B. The "Substantial Burden"--A Tremendous Burden of Proof
Faced with the difficult task of determining what constitutes a substantial
burden on religion, courts used a series of techniques that misunderstood the nature
of religious practice, thereby underprotecting religion.
1. Judicial Dismissiveness
In a number of cases, judges seem not to have taken RFRA claimants
seriously; they simply dismissed the claims out of hand. This reaction is surprising
- if nothing else, RFRA's implementation of heightened judicial scrutiny suggests
that judges should have considered free exercise claims carefully. Such seriousness
was hinted at by the august language surrounding RFRA's passage,1'3 was implicit
in the fact that Congress imposed the most stringent level of constitutional scrutiny,
and was explicit in the hopes of RFRA's supporters.' 34 But in a number of cases,
courts baldly asserted that there was no substantial burden, without any further
examination.
This occurred in a California proceeding arising out of a bankruptcy claim.
Jim Snyder, the preparer of a bankruptcy petition, argued that he should not be
required to identify himself by his Social Security number (as was required by
statute) because he believed that number to be "the mark of the beast" described in
the New Testament.13s Although the court did not challenge Snyder's sincerity, it
summarily concluded that there was no substantial burden on his religious practice:
"The fact that Snyder must provide his [Social Security number] if he wants to
prepare bankruptcy petitions simply does not rise to the level of a substantial
burden on his free exercise of religion ... ."'3In short, although the court assumed
that Snyder was forbidden by religious belief from using a Social Security
number, 37 it nonetheless concluded that forcing Snyder to choose between his
livelihood and his religious practice would not substantially burden his religious
free exercise. It reached this conclusion with no factual discussion (for instance, of
whether Snyder had an adequate, alternative job), and with no discussion of
relevant law (for instance, when and how financial conditions may be placed upon
the exercise of statutory rights, or the related doctrine of unconstitutional
133 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-111, at 4 (1993) ("Many of the men and women who settled in this
country fled tyranny abroad to practice peaceably their religion. The Nation they created was founded upon
the conviction that the right to observe one's faith, free from Government interference, is among the most
treasured birthrights of every American."), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1893-94.
134 See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 42, at 224.
135 See In re Turner, 193 B.R. 548, 551 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1996).
136 lad at 555.
137 See id
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conditions). 138 '
Of course, it was not always the case that further examination would have
led a court to find a substantial burden. Even so, this approach seems overly
dismissive in light of the spirit of religious accommodation that RFRA was
intended to foster. If this dismissive writing style truly reflects a dismissive attitude
on the part of judges, then such an attitude must certainly have limited the number
of free exercise claims to succeed under the substantial burden prong of the test.
And, one wonders, if this was the prevailing attitude of the courts, how many more
decisions were affected by this sort of dismissiveness without the dismissive
attitude evidencing itself on the face of the opinion?
2. Requiring a Greater-Than-Substantial Burden
More common than this sheer dismissiveness, many courts limited RFRA
claims by requiring free exercise claimants to demonstrate a tremendous level of
state interference with their religious practice. One of the most onerous of these
proof requirements was implemented in Bryant v. Gomez:
139
In order to show a free exercise violation using the "substantial
burden" test, the religious adherent ... has the obligation to prove
that a governmental [action] burdens the adherent's practice of
his or her religion.., by preventing him or her from engaging in
conduct or having a religious experience which the faith
mandates.14
In other words, only if the government prevented a practice mandated by a religion
could the substantial burden test be satisfied. A showing of mere hardship would be
insufficient to meet the test, as would burdens on a practice commonly engaged in
but not required. This standard takes a cramped view of the nature of religious
experience. Many religions have no central authority that "requires" practice;
138 For another example of a case in which a court concluded without discussion that there was no
substantial burden, see Blandino v. State, 914 P.2d 624 (Nev. 1996). In that case, the criminal defendant
believed that he was required by God to represent himself without the assistance of counsel. The court
rejected Blandino's claim, stating only that "this court's practice of requiring counsel on direct appeal from a
conviction does not substantially burden appellant's right to free exercise of religion." Id. at 626.
139 46 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1995).
140 Id. at 949 (quoting Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd sub
nom. Hemandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)). In addition to the Ninth Circuit, this test was
adopted by the Fourth Circuit, see Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 172-73 (4th Cir. 1995),
and by the Eleventh Circuit, see Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1522 (11th Cir. 1995). See also Daytona
Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 885 F. Supp. 1554, 1559-60 (M.D. Fla. 1995); Morris v.
Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 183 B.R. 239, 251 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995) ('To be a 'substantial
burden,' the government action must either compel a person do something in contravention of their religious
beliefs or require them to refrain from doing something required by their religious beliefs."), affj'd, 203 B.R.
468 (D. Kan. 1996); Davidson v. Davis, No. 92 CIV 4040 (SWK), 1995 WVL 60732, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14,
1995) (mem.).
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rothers tend not to phrase religious obligatiohs in terms of mandates. 4 ' And even if
a given religion does require conduct, this provides no doctrinal explanation for
excluding all non-obligatory religious practices from the scope of religious
protection. To do so falls to protect many important religious practices.' 42
Moreover, this standard runs squarely against RFRA's legislative history.
The House Report accompanying RFRA stated that "in order to violate the statute,
government activity need not coerce individuals into violating their religious
beliefs nor penalize religious activity .... Rather, the test applies whenever a law
or an action taken by the government to implement a law burdens a person's
exercise of religion."'143 RFRA's chief sponsor recognized exactly the problem
.inherent in a substantial burden test like that adopted in BrIyant:
Were Congress to ...specifically confm[e] the scope of this
legislation to those practices compelled or proscribed by a
sincerely held religious belief in all circumstances, we would run
the risk of excluding practices which are generally believed to be
exercises of religion worthy of protection. For example, many
religions do not require their adherents to pray at specific times of
the day, yet most members of Congress would consider prayer to
be an unmistakable exercise of religion.'"
Despite this clear message from Congress, the Bryant test was widely used.
Even under the chief alternative to Bryant-an alternative that appeared on
its face to be more generous to religious claimants-plaintiffs were still obliged to
141 See Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996) ("In the case of nonhierarchial religions,
... such as Islam, Judaism, and a multitude of Protestant sects, the process [of determining what practices the
plaintiffs religion obligates him to follow] is infeasible, or at least very difficult and attended with a high
degree of indeterminacy."), vacated & remanded, 522 U.S. 801 (1997) (mem.).
142 See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REv. 1 ("It is probably the
case that most religious practice is religiously motivated but not religiously mandated."); id at 23-28
(describing the problems with a test that protects only religiously-mandated practices); Laycock, supra note
43, at 893-94 (listing examples of religiously motivated practices); Steven C. Seeger, Note, Restoring Rights
to Rites: The Religious Motivation Test and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1472,
1498-1502 (1997); see, e.g., Wynn v. McManus, 76 F.3d 391, 1996 WL 32110, at *2 (9th Cir. 1996)
(unpublished table decision; text available in Westlaw) ("[Wynn, a Christian inmate] failed to establish that
any tenet of his religious faith mandated attendance at services every Sunday. Accordingly, the district court
did not err by concluding that Wynn failed to establish that prison officials substantially burdened his free
exercise of religion."). See generally Seeger, supra (discussing the three principal substantial burden tests:
religious motivation, religious compulsion, and centrality).
143 H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 6 (1993); see also Laycock & Thomas, supra note 42, at 230 ("[U]n
general, if an exercise of religion is prohibited, penalized, discriminated against, or made the basis for a loss
of entitlements, courts should find a substantial burden.").
144 Letter from Rep. Stephen J. Solarz to Rep. Don Edwards (June 22, 1992), in Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 128, 129 (1992); see also Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908 F. Supp.
1429, 1440-45 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (discussing RFRA's legislative history regarding tests of religious
compulsion versus religious motivation), aff'd, 91 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated & remanded, 521 U.S.
1114 (1997) (mem.); Muslim v. Frame, 897 F. Supp. 215,218-20 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (same).
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prove that a required practice had been forbidden. This other test was established
by Werner v. McCotter145 in the context of prison litigation:
To exceed the "substantial burden" threshold, government
regulation must significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or
expression that manifests some central tenet of a prisoner's
individual beliefs, must meaningfully curtail a prisoner's ability
to express adherence to his or her faith; or must deny a prisoner
reasonable opportunities to engage in those activities that are
fundamental to a prisoner's religion."46
On its face, the Werner test established a significantly lower threshold than Bryant
for demonstrating a substantial burden. Under Werner, religious conduct need not
be absolutely prohibited; it need only be sufficiently limited. This test, in theory,
should have protected religious free exercise better than Bryant. As the Seventh
Circuit observed:
[The Werner test is] more sensitive to religious feeling [than
Bryant]. Many religious practices that clearly are not mandatory,
such as praying the rosary, in the case of Roman Catholics, or
wearing yarmulkes, in the case of Orthodox Jews (optional
because while Jewish men are required to cover their heads, the
form of the head covering is not prescribed), are important to
their practitioners, who would consider the denial of them a grave
curtailment of their religious liberty.
147
But while this test appears protective, its results were little different than those
under Bryant.
Collins v. Scott"' demonstrates the point admirably. In that case, Kenneth
Collins, a Muslim prisoner, refused to submit to a strip search by a female guard
because the Koran encourages modesty and discourages public nakedness. Even
after explaining his beliefs to guards, and despite the presence of male guards who
could have performed the search, he was placed in a holding cell, shocked until his
body went limp, placed in ankle and wrist restraints, and his underwear was
removed in front of a female guard.'49
The court held that because the Koran discourages all nakedness, and
145 49 F.3d 1476 (10th Cir. 1995).
146 Id. at 1480 (citations omitted). A similar test was adopted in the Eighth Circuit, where a
substantial burden occurred if a worshipper was required "to refrain from religiously motivated conduct."
Brown-el v. Harris, 26 F.3d 68, 70 (8th Cir. 1994). The Seventh Circuit approved of the Eighth and Tenth
Circuit tests. See Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1178 (7th Cir. 1996).
147 Mack, 80 F.3d at 1179.
148 961 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
149 See id. at 1011-12.
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because Collins was willing to be strip searched on some limited occasions-by
male guards, and by female guards under extraordinary circumstances-his
unwillingness to be strip searched on this occasion did not manifest a central tenet
of his religion.'- In reaching its conclusion, the court pointed to Collins' belief that
Allah would not punish him for his immodesty since he had resisted the strip
search.151 Because Collins would not be punished by his deity for disobedience-a
roundabout way of saying that he was not "really" required to engage in this
practice-the court found no substantial burden. Thus, Collins suggests that while
the language of the Werner test differed from Bryant ("central tenet" instead of
"mandated" practice), the test was functionally the same: A religious claimant
would still have to prove that a required religious practice was forbidden. 2
This same limited interpretation of Werner was applied in Weir v. Nix, l53 a
case decided under the same limited Werner test in which the Eighth Circuit found
no substantial burden because the claimant's religious practice was not "mandated"
by his church. In Weir, the court considered the claims of a fundamentalist,
separatist Christian inmate who sought four hours of weekly group worship, rather
than the three hours then allowed by the prison, and asked that the services be held
on Sunday, rather than on Friday, the day then designated by the prison. 54
Although the court purported to rely on Werner,"53 it nonetheless refused to allow
the additional hour of congregate prayer, stating: "We are not convinced ... that
Weir's faith mandates any minimum number of hours of congregate worship each
week, and we believe that three hours of group worship per week provided Weir
with a reasonable opportunity to exercise his religious freedom."'" 8
Similarly, the court concluded that Weir's religion did not require Sunday
prayer, and thus created no substantial burden: "The evidence indicates that Sunday
worship, albeit traditional, is not a doctrinal necessity for fundamentalists. Two
fundamentalist pastors testified that fundamentalists could worship on any day and
that they often worship on Wednesdays."'157 This conclusion is troubling. The court
asked whether Sunday worship is "a doctrinal necessity," a piece of analysis that
runs squarely against the language of Werner."5 The chief difference between the
15o See id. at 1014.
151 See id
152 See also Reese v. Coughlin, No. 93 CIV. 4748 LAP, 1996 WL 374166, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 3,
1996) (mem.) (holding that there was no substantial burden in confiscating a Wiccan inmate's tarot cards,
despite the claimant's belief that the cards "are to him as the Bible is to those who use and rely upon it as
their source of religious authority").
153 114 F.3d 817 (8th Cir. 1997).
154, See id. at 821.
155 See id at 820.
156 Iae at 821 (emphasis added).
157 Id (emphasis added).
158 Weir, 114 F3d at 821. As a logical matter, too, this conclusion seems dubious. After all, the fact
that fundamentalists often worship on Wednesdays does not prove that there is no need for Sunday worship.
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Werner and Bryant tests, it seemed, was the fact that Werner did not inquire into
whether religiously-mandated requirements were violated. But in practice, even
under Werner, courts put a heavy weight on religious claimants to prove substantial
burdens on their religion.
Of course, the substantial burden prong of the compelling interest test was
not uniformly applied. Some courts defined substantial burden leniently, fearing
that to do otherwise would entangle the court in defining religion. Indeed, for the
Seventh Circuit, this was the greatest benefit of adopting the Werner standard. 59
However, many of the courts to take this more generous approach did so only
because they found the challenged restrictions to be justified by a compelling
government interest, rendering the substantial burden prong of the test functionally
irrelevant in those cases. 16° In the end, one can only conclude that the courts' tests
for interpreting the term "substantial burden" found many heavy burdens to be less
than substantial.
3. The Backward Results of the Substantial Burden Prong
Finally, a simple survey of the RFRA cases suggests that the courts'
substantial burden analysis was flawed. Look, for instance, at prison cases. 161 On
the one hand, religious prisoners fared best when they challenged restrictions on
symbolic religious practice, particularly where that practice created little
administrative burden for the prison. For instance, inmates prevailed in nine of
twenty challenges to restrictions on headgear1 62 or small religious items (such as
beads or jewelry),ea3 and six of sixteen challenges to restrictions on hair or beard
Consider the case of a Jew who says morning prayers daily, but also observes the Sabbath. The existence of
the former hardly disproves the need for the latter.
159 See Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[Ihe decisive argument in favor of
the generous definition of 'substantial burden,' it seems to us, is the undesirability of making judges arbiters
of religious law, as required by the alternative approach." (citations omitted)), vacated & remanded, 522 U.S.
801 (1997) (mem.); see also Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. 1429, 1444 (W.D. Wis. 1995), af'd, 91 F.3d
1018 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated & remanded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997) (mem.).
160 See, e.g., May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 563 (9th Cir. 1997); Malik v. Kindt, 107 F.3d 21, 1997
WL 39429, at *3 (10th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision; text available in Westlaw); Harris v.
Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 503 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1257 (1997); Rust v. Clarke, 883 F.
Supp. 1293, 1307 (D. Neb. 1995), afd, 89 F.3d 841 (8th Cir. 1996); Phipps v. Parker, 879 F. Supp. 734, 736
(W.D. Ky. 1995). See infra Subsection IV.C.3. for a critique of this approach.
161 For a thorough critique of the way that courts applied RFRA to prison cases, see Daniel J. Solove,
Note, Faith Profaned: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Religion in the Prisons, 106 YALE L.J.
459 (1996).
162 See, e.g., Hall v. Griego, 896 F. Supp. 1043, 1050 (D. Colo. 1995) (denying prison's motion for
summary judgment on prisoner's claim that his free exercise was burdened by restrictions on headgear);
Muslim v. Frame, 891 F. Supp. 226, 235 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (same).
163 See, e.g., Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1022-23 (7th Cir. 1996) (allowing inmate to possess a
crucifix), vacated & remanded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997) ; Lemay v. Dubois, No. CIV. A. 95-11912-PBS, 1996
WL 463680 (D. Mass. July 29, 1996); Rodriguez v. Coughlin, No. 94 CIV. 2290 (SS), 1994 WL 174298
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1994) (granting prisoner's motion for preliminary injunction against restrictions on
carrying Santeria beads); Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (same).
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length."6 As RFRA goes, these were fantastic results.
Conversely, prisoners had little success challenging the way in which
religious services were conducted. They lost every case in which they asked for
religious leaders different than those provided by the prison.16s Likewise, prisoners
lost seven of the eight cases in which they argued for services separate from other
sects of the same religion166 Overwhelmingly, courts rejected these claims on the
ground that there was no substantial burden. 67
Take, for instance, Davidson v. Davis168 In that case, Davidson challenged
the conditions of his confinement at the Metropolitan Correctional Center, the
facility to which he had been transferred so that he could pursue a civil lawsuit. 69
Among other alleged violations, Davidson complained that he was unable to
consult with the prison's Jewish chaplain. 70 The court quickly rejected Davidson's
claim.171 After briefly setting forth the restrictive Bryant test described above, the
court concluded-without analysis-that Davidson did not have the right to a
Jewish chaplain. 2 (It is interesting-and troubling-to note that the court cited
three cases to support this conclusion. All were post-Smith and pre-RFRA, and
therefore employed the wrong standard. 3) The court did not even mention
Davidson's reasons for seeking a rabbi. It did not ask whether Judaism generally, or
Davidson's religious practice specifically, involved spiritual consultation. It simply
rested on past, inapposite precedent. 74
These results-in Davidson and in the case law generally-are perplexing.
Courts protected the individual, tangible appurtenances of religion, while paying
little heed to restrictions on prayer service itself. But is this what religion is about?
I would argue that for most people, the symbolic practices that the courts did
164 See, e.g., Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 471 (D. Ariz. 1995) (allowing prisoner to grow hair).
16 See, e.g., Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1481 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding that the prison's
provision of a Lakota Sioux spiritual advisor foreclosed the existence of a substantial burden on a Cherokee
inmate's religious practice); Muhammad v. City of New York Dep't of Corrections, 904 F. Supp. 161, 189-90
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding no substantial burden in the failure to provide a Nation of Islam (NOI) minister
because there were orthodox Muslim imams, and because inmates who were members of the NOI could
receive visits from NOI ministers), appeal dismissed, 126 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 1997).
166 See, e.g., Hall v. Sullivan, 73 F.3d 373, 1995 WL 750312, at *1 (10th Cir. Dec. 14, 1995)
(unpublished table decision; text available in Westlaw); Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949-50 (9th Cir.
1995); Muhammad v. City of New York Dep't of Corrections, 904 F. Supp. at 190-91; Crosley-El v. Berge,
896 F. Supp. 885, 888-89 (E.D. Wis. 1995).
167 See supra notes 165-66.
168 No. 92 CIV 4040 (SWK), 1995 WL 60732 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 1995).
169 See id at *1.
170 See id. at *5.
171 See id.
172 See id. at *5-6.
173 See Davidson, 1995 WL 60732, at *5-6.
174 See id.
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protect are somewhat less important than attendance at religious services. Given the
choice, most people would prefer to be restricted in their ability to wear a cross, a
kufi or a medicine pouch, rather than to suffer restrictions on attending religious
services. This is not to suggest that symbolic practices are unimportant. Quite the
contrary. These practices often fulfill religious commandments and, even when not
required by the religion, express religio-cultural identity. 17 5 But prayer is something
different altogether. It is the mechanism through which people communicate with
the Divine. It seems perverse that courts protected outward markers of religion,
while allowing fundamental restrictions on expressions of religious devotion.
A final, important caveat is in order. In making this argument about
backward results, I do not contend that restrictions on religious services are never
warranted, although my disapproving tone may so suggest. On the contrary,
particularly in the prison context, it seems clear that restrictions are often necessary.
But that determination is irrelevant to substantial burden-it is part of the
compelling interest prong of the test. My point is simply this: In many cases where
the government appeared to have imposed significant burdens on religion, courts
reached the opposite conclusion.
C. Compelling Interest
Equally important in evaluating RFRA's efficacy is the way in which
courts applied the compelling interest prong of the test. For even if courts
employed the substantial burden analysis in a manner solicitous of religious
claimants, the outcome of RFRA cases would still depend on how courts construed
the compelling interest prong of the test. If courts were skeptical or demanding in
reviewing the state interests put forward by government actors, then many free
exercise claims would likely prevail; conversely, if courts deferred to government
actors, then few free exercise claims would survive. Likewise, broader or narrower
definitions of "compelling interest" would allow more or fewer government
policies to survive. In short, a soft compelling interest standard-just like an
unduly high substantial burden standard-would act as a trump card. Either would
spell failure for many religious claims. As shown above, a high threshold for
substantial burdens did limit the test's application. And, as this Section will
demonstrate, so too did a deferential compelling interest standard.
Courts limited RFRA by means of two permissive standards, and a bit of
foggy analysis. The first limitation is rooted in the compelling interest test itself.
The test provided courts no guidance in identifying the appropriate government
interest to be analyzed. Left with this discretion, courts often identified the broadest
possible interest and, predictably, found this interest compelling. Second, in certain
contexts-particularly prisons--courts accorded tremendous deference to
administrators' assessments of what constitutes a compelling interest. 7 6 Finally,
175 See Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1481 (10th Cir. 1995) ("We recognize that religious
symbols often play an important role in expressing an individual's adherence to a particular faith; possession
of the symbol in and of itself manifests belief in one's religious creed.").
176 These two problems-generality and deference-often overlap. For instance, courts often
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courts tended to blend the substantial burden and compelling interest prongs of the
analysis, substituting a vague balancing approach for the proper statutory test. As a
practical matter, this blending technique meant that when courts perceived highly
compelling interests, they paid less attention to burdens on religion.
1. Broad Government Interests
In a RFRA case, once a religious claimant successfully demonstrated a
substantial burden on her religious practice, the court then evaluated whether the
government had shown a compelling interest to justify the burden. Evaluating
compelling interests requires two steps-identifying the appropriate government
interest to evaluate and, only after that initial determination, judging whether that
interest was "compelling." I consider the latter issue below. Here, I wish to focus
on the question of what government interest to evaluate. This is a crucial issue,
because defining a government interest broadly makes it sound weighty-i.e.,
compelling-whereas a narrowly-defined interest sounds far less important." 7
Interest definition is not a new concept, at least in the realm of individual
rights. 78 Courts and commentators have long debated the proper scope of disputed
rights in substantive due process cases. Bowers v. Hardwick7 9 paints just such a
dispute in stark contrast. Writing for the majority, Justice White stated that "[t]he
issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.' '18° In dissent, Justice Blackmun perceived
the issue to be far broader:
This case is no more about "a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy," as the Court purports to declare, ante, at
2844, than Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), was about a
fundamental right to watch obscene movies, or Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), was about a fundamental right to
place interstate bets from a telephone booth. Rather, this case is
about "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men," namely, "the right to be let alone."
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
unthinkingly accepted a government administrator's definition of an extremely broad interest. I have
separated these two problems analytically in order to highlight the ways in which each limits free exercise
claims.
177 See J. Morris Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REv. 327, 330-31
(1969) ("The purpose of almost any law can be traced back to one or another of the fundamental concerns of
government: public health and safety, public peace and order, defense revenue. To measure an individual
interest directly against one of those rarified values inevitably makes the individual interest appear the less
significant").
178 See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1057 (1990) (discussing the problem of generality manipulation in rights definition).
179 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
180 Id at 190.
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J., dissenting). 181
This sort of dispute over generality is quite common. Even when such a debate is
not clear on the face of an opinion, it often simmers below the surface, where the
court must implicitly have determined what right was at issue. For instance, in
Griswold v. Connecticut,5 2 the Supreme Court might have identified Ms.
Griswold's right as the "right to buy contraception," the "right to prevent
pregnancy," the "right to control procreative sex," the "right to plenary sexual
freedom," or the "right to autonomous self-determination."' 3
However, despite the attention to generality manipulation in the realm of
individual rights, "generality is hardly ever discussed in the context of government
interests."184 This is a critical omission. For just as a court's designation of a broad
individual interest often leads that individual right to be upheld in a substantive due
process case, the identification of a broad government interest made a ruling for the
government more likely in a RFRA case. 88 Simply put, "Courts possess enormous
discretion over how broadly or narrowly government interests are defined.... In
the absence of any theoretical guide, judges have used their control over generality
to strike down government policies that they just as easily could have upheld.""8
Conversely, in the absence of proper limits, courts might define an interest broadly,
thereby ensuring its success. In the context of religious free exercise, broad
definition has been the norm.
Since long before RFRA, courts have upheld state impositions on religious
free exercise by identifying exceptionally broad governmental interests. In
Reynolds v. United States, 87 the first case decided under the Free Exercise Clause,
the Supreme Court upheld a Utah anti-polygamy law as necessary to protect "the
11 Id at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
182 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
183 Roger Craig Green, Note, Interest Definition in Equal Protection: A Study of Judicial Technique,
108 YALE L.J. 439, 444-45 (1998); see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989)
(attempting to identify the interest at issue in a case involving visitation rights); Robert C. Farrell, Legislative
Purpose and Equal Protection's Rationality Review, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1, 11 (1992) (identifying six possible
government interests that might justify a hypothetical law requiring annual inspections of automotive
emissions systems). See generally David L. Faigman, Measuring Constitutionality Transactionally, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 753, 778-83 (1994) (discussing the ways in which generality manipulation influences
constitutional balancing tests).
184 Green, supra note 183, at 445. When religious commentators do deal with this issue, it tends to be
in passing. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-13, at 1261 ("[Before
United States v. Lee, t]he Court's opinions made clear that the only constitutionally relevant factor was the
state's interest in denying the claimant's exemption, not the state's usually much greater interest in
maintaining the underlying rule or program for unexceptional cases."); Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free
Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 310-12; Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious
Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 436 (1986).
185 See Green, supra note 183, at 454-59.
186 See id. at 447; see also id. at 447-49 (pointing to Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), as an
example of narrow definition).
187 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
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social condition. ''le In State v. Massey,189 the North Carolina Supreme Court
upheld a statute that prohibited religious snakehandling because it protected "the
public safety." 190 The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld a similar statute based on
"the right to guard against the unnecessary creation of widows and orphans,"
reasoning that "[o]ur state and nation have an interest in having a strong, healthy,
robust, taxpaying citizenry capable of self-support and of bearing arms and adding
to the resources and reserves of manpower.' 191
This pattern continued under RFRA. Consider two examples. In Blandino
v. State,192 the defendant-who had been charged with a violation of custody
rights-wanted to represent himself during his criminal appeal because "his
religious beliefs precluded him from relying on the advice of persons who do not
share his beliefs."'193 The court found no substantial burden,194 then considered the
compelling interest prong of the test. Its entire reasoning was this: "[W]e consider
the state's interest in insuring an adequate appellate review of judgments which
deprive individuals of their liberty to be compelling."' 95
The second example concerns a health insurance system that included
coverage for abortions. 96 A group of students at the University of California at
Davis sued to be exempt from a required student fee, part of which funded the
insurance program, on the ground that it violated their free exercise. 97 The court
found no substantial burden on the students' religious liberty.'90 Then, instead of
evaluating the interest furthered by an individual registration fee, the court
considered the interests served by the insurance system as a whole. The court
concluded simply "that the University's interest in the health and well-being of its
students, advanced by its mandatory fee policy, is compelling.' 91
l8 Id. at 166.
189 51 S.E.2d 179 (N.C. 1949).
190 Id at 180.
191 State ex reL Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 113 (Tenn. 1975). It is important to recognize that the
courts in Reynolds and Massey did not apply strict scrutiny of the sort mandated by RFRA. As such, those
courts were not searching for a "compelling interest" However, while the formal mechanism of analysis was
not the same, the goal was identical--to search for a government interest that could justify the infringement
on religious free exercise. Cf Berg, supra note 49, at 32 ("The 'compelling interest' language alone has failed
to provide sufficient guidance for concrete decisions. It has proven too subjective, requiring courts to gauge
the abstract 'importance' ofa government purpose.").
19"2 914 P.2d 624 (Nev. 1996).
193 Id at625.
194 See ld at 626-27.
195 Id at 627.
196 See Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1996).
197 See id at 1297.
198 See id at 1300.
199 Id
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It is hard to dispute the importance of the interests described by these
courts. It is true, of course, that the criminal justice system depends on effective
appellate advocacy. Likewise, U.C. Davis' university health insurance system does
serve the interests described in Goehring. Even so, Blandino and Goehring evince a
disturbing trend. To see why, compare the ways in which courts characterized
substantial burdens and compelling interests. On the one hand, when courts
evaluated the burden on the religious plaintiff, they tended to consider only the
plaintiff's specific religious practice. 200 So in Goehring, for instance, the Ninth
Circuit engaged in a highly fact-specific analysis of the burden.201 It noted that,
although the registration fee was mandatory for all students, the health insurance
subsidy paid out of registration fees "is not a substantial sum of money" and,
"[f]urthermore, the plaintiffs are not required to accept, participate in, or advocate
in any manner for the provision of abortion services."2 2 In other words, despite the
university's "stipulat[ion] that the plaintiffs' sincerely held religious beliefs
prohibit them from financially contributing to abortions," 203 the court concluded
that, since not much of the plaintiffs' money went to abortions, there was not much
of a burden.204
On the other hand, courts looked at governmental interests in the broadest
possible terms. Thus, in Goehring, the plaintiffs indirect subsidy of abortions was
weighed against the health of the entire student body. By using these nearly
opposite methods to identify interests, courts heavily stacked the analytical deck.
For just this reason, this methodology has been roundly criticized:
[B]y failing to use the same level of generality on both sides of
the balance, courts violate an essential premise of the method. If,
in fact, a single scale describes the intersection of individual
liberty and government interests, the factors must be measured in
the same units. To do otherwise is akin to comparing the weight
of an apple in ounces to the weight of an orange in grams. The
comparison is possible, but a conversion table would be
necessary to understand the result.205
It is jurisprudentially unfair to manipulate the generality of government and
200 Cf supra Section IV.B. (discussing courts' reluctance to find substantial burdens).
201 See Goehring, 94 F.3d at 1299-1300.
202 Id. at 1300.
203 Id. at 1299 n.5.
204 See id. at 1300.
205 Faigman, supra note 183, at 780; see also Pepper, supra note 184, at 310 ("For a balancing test to
make any sense, relatively equal levels of generality or abstraction must be chosen for each side of the
balance."); id. at 312 (criticizing the arguments of Solicitor General Charles Fried in two cases in which he
"inflate[d] the governmental interest to a high level of generality while confining the interest in religious
freedom to a narrow focus, in effect taking the thumb off the religious freedom side of the balance and
moving it to the governmental interest side of the balance").
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individual interests, amplifying the importance of the government curtailment of
religion while using the same technique to mute the interests of the individual
religious claimant. Whatever outcome might be desired as a normative matter, this
uncalibrated scale is sure to skew the result.
In fact, a less slanted alternative to this broad interest definition did exist.
Instead of merely identifying a broadly-stated interest, a court could perform a fact-
specific investigation to determine whether limited religious exceptions to the
general statutory rule were feasible.206 For instance, in Jasniowski v. Rushing,207 an
Illinois court analyzed whether RFRA protected a landlord's religiously-motivated
refusal to rent an apartment to an unmarried couple, thereby mandating an
exception to the city's fair housing ordinance.2 °0 The court identified a substantial
burden in the fact that Jasniowski was "forced to choose between his religious
convictions and compliance with the Chicago housing ordinance." 209 As in
Blandino and Goehring, the court found the burden to be justified by a compelling
government interest. However, instead of identifying a broad interest-such as
"protecting privacy," for instance-the court felt compelled to take a narrower
approach: "The City of Chicago has an interest in prohibiting housing
discrimination generally. For free exercise analysis, however, the courts
consistently explain that the state's interest must be narrowly defined. Thus, the
narrower question is whether specifically prohibiting housing discrimination
against unmarried cohabiting couples is a compelling governmental interest."
21
After some further analysis, the court found a compelling interest.21'
This is not to say that such "case-specific and fact-intensive analysis" is
necessarily the best approach.212 In fact, it has been criticized for "indeterminacy
and subjectivity," and for setting an unduly high burden for the state to show a
compelling interest.213 But regardless which approach one prefers as a normative
matter, it is essential to recognize that alternatives to generality manipulation did
and do exist. Many claims were dismissed based on an analytically faulty
methodology that weighed the broadly-stated interests of society against the rights
of individuals. This need not have been so.
206 See Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free xercise Clause, 57
OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 78-81 (1996) (discussing "ad hoe balancing" as a standard that is highly protective of free
exercise).
207 678 N.E.2d 743 (Il. App. Ct.), vacated, 685 N.E.2d 622 (111 1997).
208 See id. at 745.
209 Id at 749.
210 Id at 750 (citations omitted).
211 See id. at 750-51. The analysis of compelling interest used in Jasniowski is an interesting study.
Even though the court identified a fairly narrow compelling interest---the point for which I cite this case-it
nonetheless found the interest to be a necessary component of a far broader societal goal (the operation of the
housing market).
212 Gressman & Carmella, supra note 206, at 80-81.
213 Id
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2. Compelling Interest Deference-Accepting the Government's
Say-So
Complementing and enhancing broad interest definition was the way in
which courts deferred almost completely to government actors. In many RFRA
cases, government defendants stated broad compelling interests to justify the
burdens they placed on religion, and courts accepted-and adopted-those
rationales, sometimes seemingly unthinkingly. The issue is posed most starkly in
the context of prisons.214
Deference to prison administrators has long been the norm. In Turner v.
Safley,215 the Supreme Court established a highly deferential test for analyzing
prison regulations: "[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional
rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests. 216 Later, in O'Lone v. Shabazz,217 the Court imported this same standard
into the consideration of prisoners' religious claims.218 These cases were both
decided under pre-Smith strict scrutiny. Thus, if anything, the harsher standard in
Employment Division v. Smith219 fortified this deference. 2 '
During the legislative debates on RFRA, this issue arose again. Indeed, one
of the chief criticisms of RFRA was its application to prisoners. 2 ' Perhaps in
response to prison officials' strong objections to RFRA,2m2 the Senate Report
214 In this Subsection, I discuss only deference to prison administrators. The reason is a practical one.
In judicial opinions concerning prison conditions, courts often rehearsed the compelling interests recited by
prison administrators. Thus, it is easy to tell when the court merely adopted the government's position and, as
a result, these cases provide the clearest evidence of the courts' deference to the government.
215 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
216 Id. at 89.
217 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
218 See id. at 349.
219 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
220 Even Justice O'Connor, who concurred in the Smith result but bitterly contested its reasoning, see
494 U.S. at 891, would have preserved special solicitude for prison officials. In Smith, she wrote that there
exist "narrow, specialized contexts in which we have not traditionally required the government to justify a
burden on religious conduct by articulating a compelling interest." Id. at 900-01. According to O'Connor,
these areas include the government's conduct of its internal affairs, the military-and prisons. See id at 901.
Certain justices have occasionally argued against this blanket deference, but they have been in the minority.
See, e.g., Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 593 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (cautioning against the
tendency to "substitute the rhetoric of'judicial deference for meaningful review of constitutional claims in a
prison setting").
221 See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 18-24 (1993) (separate statement of Senator Alan Simpson) (opposing
RFRA because it would place an additional burden on prisons), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1906-
12; see also supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. In fact, two years after RFRA's passage, Senator Reid
introduced a bill to render RFRA inapplicable to prisons. See S. 206, 105th Cong. (1997) ("A bill to prohibit
the application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, or any amendment made by such Act, to
an individual who is incarcerated in a Federal, State, or local correctional, detention, or penal facility, and for
other purposes.").
222 See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 25-38. The Senate report reproduced four letters that opposed the
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instructed courts to defer to prison administrators: "[T]he committee expects that
the courts will continue the tradition of giving due deference to the experience and
expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and
procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent with
consideration of costs and limited resources."" 3 But this deference was not
intended to be unqualified. On the contrary, both the House and Senate Reports
criticized O Lone." 4 The Senate Report could not have been clearer: "[T]he intent
of [RFRA] is to restore the traditional protection afforded to prisoners to observe
their religions which was weakened by the decision in OLone v. Estate of
Shabazz."2 5 So while courts should give deference to prison administrators, the
Senate Judiciary Committee stated that such deference must be limited:
"[I]nadequately formulated prison regulations and policies grounded on mere
speculation, exaggerated fears, or post-hoc rationalizations will not suffice to meet
the act's requirements.""26 From the beginning, the level of deference to be
accorded by courts applying RFRA was uncertain.
But while the message from Congress was unclear, its application in the
courts was not-courts were extremely deferential to prison administrators. When
officials articulated any interest more specific than just "security" or "penological
interests," judges accepted those officials' explanations with the most minimal of
scrutiny. Indeed, sometimes just "security" was enough. In the leading analysis of
RFRA in prisons, Daniel Solove referred to the courts' approach as
"nonskepticism."' 7 This approach, Solove argued, "has led to decisions based on
intuition and conjecture rather than on empirical data and facts. As a result, prison
regulations of dubious validity and narrowness have easily passed muster .... ,
The case of R. Tim Phipps is illustrative."29 Phipps, a Hasidic Jewish
prisoner, was forced to undergo a "burr" haircut despite his religious objections. t °
He brought a challenge under RFRA, but the court summarily disposed of his
claim. It noted the Biblical passage containing the relevant commandment,
assumed that the haircut created a substantial burden, and moved on to a
compelling interest analysis:
application of RFRA to prisoners: a letter from 26 state attorneys-general, see id. at 25-34; two letters from
the Executive Director of the Association of State Correctional Administrators, see id. at 35-36; and a letter
from 12 Republican members of the House of Representatives, see id at 37-38.
223 Id at 10, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1900.
224 See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 9-11, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898-1901; H.R. REP.
No. 103-88, at 7 (1993).
225 S. REP. No. 103-111, at 9, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1899 (citing O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987)).
226 S. REP. No. 103-111, at 10, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1900.
227 Solove, supra note 161, at 460.
228 Id.
229 See Phipps v. Parker, 879 F. Supp. 734 (W.D. Ky. 1995).
230 See id. at 734.
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The court finds the safety concerns offered by the defendants to
be sufficiently compelling to satisfy the RFRA standard. The
ability of prison officials to quickly identify inmates and protect
prison guards and inmates from hidden contraband are matters of
paramount concern sufficient to justify small intrusions on
prisoners' free exercise rights.231
Two short sentences later, the court had finished its compelling interest analysis.
To fully appreciate the extent of the court's deference, it is useful to briefly
consider the alternative. A second action brought by Phipps places the issue in
contrast.232 Ten months after Phipps' first claim was denied, he filed a preliminary
injunction in the same federal judicial district. That court reached the opposite
conclusion as the first court. It was more skeptical of the prison's justifications, and
looked slightly more carefully at the circumstances surrounding Phipps' haircut:
The record shows that Phipps was placed in segregation on
March 10, 1994. Apparently, defendants waited three months
until they cut his hair. Waiting three months to cut Phipps' hair
weakens defendants' argument that their governmental interest is
compelling. If defendants' security concerns were as compelling
as they claim, then they would have cut Phipps' hair as soon as he
entered the cellhouse.2a
But the court did not rely solely on this circumstantial evidence. It also considered
whether cutting Phipps' hair was necessary to meet the prison's stated goals:
Further, shaving [Phipps'] earlocks may not be the least
restrictive means of furthering [defendants'] interest. For
example, while Phipps' hair is short, defendants could
photograph him for security reasons. Finally, Phipps only asks
that defendants be prohibited from cutting his earlocks. It would
be difficult for Phipps to hide contraband in this small amount of
hair and it would not create an undue hardship on defendants to
search his earlocks.23
The court granted Phipps' motion for a preliminary injunction, thereby preventing
the prison from cutting Phipps' payess (earlocks).2
However, given the choice between these two approaches, courts adopted
231 Id. at 736.
232 See Estep v. Dent, 914 F. Supp. 1462 (W.D. Ky. 1996).
233 Id. at 1467.
234 Id.
235 See id. at 1468.
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the former. Deference to prison administrators prevailed. Indeed, some courts did
not merely adopt, but actually enforced, deference to regulations. One case in
particular, Hamilton v. Schriro,2 s suggests that too much judicial scrutiny of prison
policies was cause for reversal. In that case, a district court considered the claims of
a Native American prisoner who wished to grow his hair long, and to use a sweat
lodge and other religious items.237 The district court did not give the prison total
deference, but neither did it dispute any prison administrator's claim that was
supported by evidence.
In considering the prisoner's free exercise claim, the district court
examined whether the prison had presented sufficient evidence of a compelling
interest. Even this limited inquiry proved to be reversible error. The court's
analysis bears repeating in full, to illustrate the sort of limited judicial investigation
that could be overruled:
Defendants state long hair can be used to conceal drugs, weapons
and contraband, and can be changed to alter appearance and make
identification more difficult. Female prisoners in Missouri,
however, are allowed to wear long hair although the hair can be
used to conceal drugs, weapons and contraband. Likewise,
identification photographs of some male prisoners taken when the
inmates had long hair were not retaken after the hair was cut,
suggesting identification problems are not real. Further, there was
no evidence presented of identification problems with those
inmates as a result of their photographs and altered hairstyles, and
only minimal evidence of any problems with contraband
concealed in long hair. The deposition testimony from other
maximum security institutions which allow long hair reported no
significant problems with hair length.2
On the one hand, this analysis was thorough. It highlighted the inconsistencies
between the defendants' claims and their prior actions. These were serious
inconsistencies-as a logical matter, it seems odd to categorize the hair regulations
as compelling if they were not enforced against women. Moreover, the court noted
the lack of evidence to support the prison's supposed compelling interest, an
observation that seemed to place an evidentiary burden on prisons.
On the other hand, the district court in Hamilton did not judge the validity
of the officials' claims. To the contrary, it suggested areas in which further
evidence might have convinced the court. Because of the lack of evidence
presented by defendants, and because the prison had taken "substantial steps to
accommodate Christians, Jews and Muslims in providing facilities and
opportunities to meet and pray," the court found that defendants' "reluctance to do
23S 863 F. Supp. 1019 (W.D. Mo. 1994), rev'd, 74 F.3d 1545 (8th Cir. 1996).
237 See id. at 1021.
238 Id at 1023.
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the same for Native Americans is based on lack of information, speculation,
exaggerated fears and post-hoc rationalizations, not on real evidence of
problems., 239 Then, sensitive both to Hamilton's religious needs and the prison's
security interests, the court ordered the parties to "meet and arrive at a compromise
acceptable to each of the parties.' '
This decision was overturned on the ground that the district court had not
given the prison officials due deference.241 In overturning the district court, the
Eighth Circuit first considered the issue of long hair. It noted prison officials'
testimony that long hair could be used to conceal contraband and weapons, and as a
gang marker.242 After noting that the Eighth Circuit had previously upheld the
validity of similar penological concerns, the court emphasized the need for wide-
ranging deference to prison administrators:
The safety and security concerns expressed by prison officials
were based on their collective experience of administering
correctional facilities. These are valid and weighty concerns.
Moreover, there is no viable less restrictive means of addressing
these concerns. Therefore, we conclude that the district court
erred in its interpretation and application of the least restrictive
means prong of the compelling interest test in RFRA. The district
court failed to give due deference to the prison officials'
testimony that long hair presented a risk to prison safety and
security and that no viable less restrictive means of achieving that
goal existed. 243
The court ignored the lack of evidence presented by the prison, and did not
consider the actions taken by the prison that belied the testimony of its
administrators. Particularly in light of the lower court's analysis, this portion of the
decision suggests that a court was required to yield to a prison administrator who
identified an interest as compelling.
The court's analysis of the religious items requested by Hamilton was
similar. It noted that prison administrators had described the security concerns
posed by the various religious items. In the end, the Eighth Circuit concluded that
"the district court failed to give due deference to prison officials who testified as to
the necessity of the prison hair length regulation and prohibition against a sweat
lodge to maintain prison safety and security. . . . [T]he prison officials'
justifications for the hair length regulation and prohibition of a sweat lodge
239 Id. at 1024.
240 Id. at 1020.
241 See Hamilton, 74 F.3d at 1557.
242 See id. at 1554.
243 Id. at 1555.
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ceremony were sufficient." 244
Naturally, courts were not uniformly deferential across the many types of
RFRA claims. Courts tended to be less deferential to prison administrators when an
inmate's symbolic practices were at issue-growing long hair,24 wearing religious
headgear,248 or carrying small religious items such as beads or jewelry.2 47 But these
practices made up only a fraction of prisoners' free exercise claims. And while
courts were less deferential when these sorts of claims were at issue, their inquiry
was far from searching in most cases. This near-total acquiescence to government
actors seems at odds with RFRA's goal of enhancing religious liberty. For in many
cases a prison administrator's primary concern is not the religious liberty of the
prisoner, but how to keep a prison running safely and smoothly. Thus, it was left to
the courts to ask whether the chosen method of operating prisons was improperly at
odds with religious liberty. To defer this task entirely to the very actor whose
policy was being challenged runs counter to the intent of Congress and the goal of
the Act. And in practical terms, by refusing to consider even whether there existed
evidence to support prison administrators' claims, courts guaranteed that most
claimants would lose.
3. Analytical Sloppiness
In addition to these poor structural devices for determining what
constitutes a compelling interest, courts often failed to isolate the substantial
burden from the compelling interest prong of the test. Formally speaking, the
existence of a compelling governmental interest should have been irrelevant to
whether the plaintiff demonstrated a substantial burden. Only after evaluating the
nature of the burden should the court have considered the government's interest.
But in a number of opinions, it appears that courts mixed the two analyses.
In some cases, instead of using the three-part test mandated by the statute,
it appears that the court simply weighed the burden on the religious claimant
against the social value of the policy. This seems to have been the case in Morris v.
Midway S. Baptist Church.2 48 In the context of considering whether religious tithes
were "fraudulent transfers" for purposes of Title 7 bankruptcy, the court employed
the following analysis: "In comparison to this modest burden on the debtors'
244 Id at 1557.
245 See, e.g., Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 471 (D. Ariz. 1995) (allowing prisoner to grow hair).
246 See, e.g., Hall v. Griego, 896 F. Supp. 1043 (D. Colo. 1995) (denying prison's motion for
summary judgment on prisoner's claim that his free exercise was burdened by restrictions on headgear);
Muslim v. Frame, 891 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (same).
247 See, e.g., Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 1996) (allowing inmate to possess a crucifix),
vacated & remanded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997) ; Lemay v. Dubois, No. CIV. A. 95-11912-PBS, 1996 WL
463680 (D. Mass. July 29, 1996); Rodriguez v. Coughlin, No. 94 CIV. 2290 (SS), 1994 WL 174298
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1994) (granting prisoner's motion for preliminary injunction against restrictions on
carrying Santeria beads); Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (same).
248 203 B.R. 468 (D. Kan. 1996).
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practice of religion, the government's significant interests in maintaining an
equitable system for protecting creditors, for permitting debtors to obtain a 'fresh
start' from overwhelming debt, and in avoiding excessive entanglement with
religious matters are compelling., 249 This seems squarely at odds with the statutory
formulation.
In a second sort of sloppiness, courts gave short shrift to substantial burden
analysis, and moved quickly to compelling interest. Often, the opinion proceeded
as follows. After introducing the facts of the case, the court contemplated whether
the plaintiff demonstrated a substantial burden. After some slight analysis, the court
stated that there may be-in fact, probably was-a substantial burden but, either
way, the state had shown a compelling interest. At that point, the court then
considered compelling interest. For instance, in Winburn v. Bologna,250 the court
considered a federal prison inmate's claim that he was wrongfully deprived of
racist religious materials.251 After briefly describing the strict scrutiny standard, the
court engaged in a perfunctory analysis, slipping easily from substantial burden
into compelling interest:
Plaintiff has failed to establish that his right to exercise his faith
was substantially burdened by the rejection of his mail. Plaintiff's
affidavit demonstrates, in fact, that some of the material that was
rejected was available to him in the prison library. Further, even
if the rejection of the mail substantially burdened his ability to
exercise his faith, the interest in maintaining prison security
constitutes a compelling interest which would justify the burden
on Plaintiff's rights.
252
These three sentences represent the court's entire consideration of the RFRA claim.
It is essential to note that, although the type of analysis used in Winburn
and Morris was sloppy, it might nonetheless reach the proper result. In the final
calculus, the substantiality of the burden is irrelevant if the government's interest is
compelling. Even so, the blurring of the test is problematic. Leave aside the
inappropriateness of a conclusory discussion like that in Winburn, a point that I
discussed earlier.253 My concern is this: A mushy transition from substantial burden
to compelling interest points to similarly mushy underlying analysis. Rather than
adequately considering the burden on religion on its own terms, the court seems to
have been blinded by a massive government interest. This has several likely
consequences.
First, it sets the table for an inequitable weighing of the burden on the
249 Id. at 477.
250 979 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. Mich. 1997).
251 See id. at 533.
252 Id. at 535.
253 See supra Subsection IV.B. 1.
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individual against the interest of the government. As discussed earlier, courts have
a tendency to take into account only the burden suffered by a particular plaintiff
while considering a policy's broad social ends.2 4 This has the effect of making the
claimant's burden seem slight. To then weigh the one against the other (instead of
asking whether the burden on the plaintiff was substantial and the government's
interest was compelling, as required by the statute) could only exacerbate this
dwarfing effect.
Second, neglecting the substantial burden analysis because of an important
government interest may mean that the claimant's burden received insufficient
attention. To skip over this part of the analysis-on the ground that this piece of the
inquiry was unnecessary to reach the correct result-is to suggest that legal
proceedings are only about result. Process matters, particularly for these plaintiffs.
In light of RFRA's purpose, it seems important-indeed, essential-for courts to
consider the claims of plaintiffs like these carefully, diligently, and respectfully.
Even if a court did decide that the government's interest was compelling, it should
have taken the time to recognize the fact that society burdened the plaintiff's
religious practice. Indeed, such a recognition was probably more important in a
case that the plaintiff was going to lose; that portion of the judicial opinion might
have been the only formal recognition by the government of the burden placed on
that plaintiff. To slide rhetorically past religious burdens because of the existence
of government interests is to give short shrift to the plaintiffs' claims. It exhibits
exactly the lack of solicitude that RFRA was designed to correct.
The final problem with this analytical sloppiness is that it may have led to
bad outcomes. By focusing on the overwhelming nature of the government interest,
courts often ignored the "least restrictive means" prong of the test. I turn now to
that piece of the analysis.
D. Least Restrictive Means
Under the compelling interest test, even if a court found a substantial
burden on religious free exercise and concluded that the burden was justified by a
compelling government interest, it still had to determine whether the chosen means
to that end was the least restrictive one. That is, the court had to consider whether
there existed alternative means of effectuating the government's policy that would
burden religion less. On its face, this task was an expansive one. Justice Blackmun
observed this fact in expressing his disapproval of the least restrictive means prong
of the compelling interest test:
"[L]east drastic means" is a slippery slope and also the signal of
the result the Court has chosen to reach. A judge would be
unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a
little less "drastic" or a little less "restrictive" in almost any
situation, and thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation
254 See supra Subsection IV.C.1.
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down.25
But even if it is true that the "least restrictive means" inquiry is subject to judicial
abuse, it does not follow that courts should ignore this part of the test. Not only was
it part of the statutory standard, but least restrictive means could serve a critical
balancing function by allowing courts to protect religious interests while
simultaneously providing legislatures with alternative means to effectuate their
policy goals. However, courts applying RFRA largely ignored the least restrictive
means analysis. This rejection took two forms.
First, courts often accepted broad statements that no less restrictive means
existed. This seems unsurprising in light of the preceding discussion of judicial
deference. 256 Consider again Hamilton v. Schriro,257 in which the Eighth Circuit
found insufficient deference to prison officials to be grounds for reversal.2 ' As
they had with compelling interest, the district and appellate courts did battle over
least restrictive means. The prison had prohibited Native American inmates from
having long hair, and from using a sweat lodge and other religious items. It
contended that the restrictions were justified by considerations of "safety, security
and cost."259 However, the district court found that the prison administrators had
made little attempt to protect these interests in a manner less restrictive than the
absolute prohibitions that the prison did adopt:
In denying plaintiffs request, corrections personnel in
Missouri did not (1) make any inquiry of problems encountered
by personnel at institutions which allow the practice of Native
American religions; (2) contact any Native American religious
leader to determine the feasibility of plaintiff's requests, or to
determine whether other acceptable alternatives existed; or (3) do
a cost analysis or make inquiry regarding the availability of funds
or the amount of funds that would be required. Instead, Missouri
corrections personnel relied on their experience in corrections
work and on a belief that such practices would interfere with the
safety and security of the institution. They made absolutely no
effort to determine whether the religious practices could be
accommodated while still taking care of safety and security
concerns.
28
255 Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188-89 (U.S. 1979)
(Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1556 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Illinois
State Bd. of Elections).
256 See supra Subsection IV.C.2.
257 863 F. Supp. 1019 (W.D. Mo. 1994), rev'd, 74 F.3d 1545 (8th Cir. 1996).
258 See 74 F.3d at 1557; see also supra text accompanying notes 236-44.
259 863 F. Supp. at 1024.
260 Id. at 1023.
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Thus, the district court concluded:
Although safety, security and cost concerns may be shown to be
compelling governmental interests in the prison setting,
defendants have not shown that the regulations and practices used
by the Missouri Department of Corrections are the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest. Defendants have not
even shown a willingness, after enactment of the statute, to
implement less restrictive means in the absence of a court order to
do so.26
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit took the opposite approach. After briefly
noting that "[u]nder RFRA, the prison officials bear the burden of demonstrating
that the regulation is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling
interest," 26 the court then engaged in a two-and-one-half page exposition of the
need for deference to prison administrators.263 It emphasized pro-deference
citations from RFRA's legislative history,2 4 while relegating to a closing footnote
the Senate's clear instruction that deference to prison administrators should be
limited.26s It then engaged in the following abbreviated inquiry into a less
restrictive alternative: "Moreover, there is no viable less restrictive means of
addressing these concerns." 266 That one sentence was the court's entire analysis.
Interestingly, the court supported this conclusion with a footnote to the first
disposition in Phipps v. Parker (in which a court upheld a prison regulation that
required a Jewish prisoner to cut his earlocks), 267 but ignored the contrary
conclusion in the later case involving the same plaintiff.2' As in the context of
compelling interest, unqualified deference regarding the least restrictive means
analysis meant that religious claimants were almost certain to lose.
The least restrictive means test was curtailed by a second form of
limitation. Courts refused to consider exemptions for religious adherents as a less
restrictive means. Or, more precisely, when courts did consider such exemptions,
261 Id at 1024.
262 74 F.3d at 1552.
263 See id. at 1552-54.
264 See id. at 1553 (quoting S. REP. No. 103-111, at 9 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892,
1898).
265 See id. at 1554 n.10 (quoting S. REP. No. 103-111, at 10 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1892, 1900).
266 Id at 1555.
267 See id. at 1555 (quoting Phipps v. Parker, 879 F. Supp. 734, 736 (W.D. Ky. 1995)); see also supra
text accompanying notes 230-31 (discussing Phipps).
268 See Estep v. Dent, 914 F. Supp. 1462 (W.D. Ky. 1996); see also supra text accompanying notes
232-35 (discussing Estep).
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they almost inevitably found them unacceptable. As an historical matter, this
approach predates RFRA; indeed, it has been used by the Supreme Court,
particularly in cases contesting forced participation in social insurance systems.
The effect, however, is to eliminate a potentially effective means of allowing
religious claimants and neutral government policies to exist simultaneously.
This methodology was employed by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Lee.269 In that case, decided long before the enactment of RFRA, the Court
considered the claims of an Amish farmer who failed to withhold Social Security
taxes because the Amish "believe it sinful not to provide for their own elderly and
needy and therefore are religiously opposed to the national Social Security
system., 270 The Court accepted that the "compulsory participation in the Social
Security system interferes with [the] free exercise rights [of the Amish].,, 271 Even
so, exemptions were not warranted because "it would be difficult to accommodate
the comprehensive Social Security system with myriad exceptions flowing from a
wide variety of religious beliefs. 272 Several years later, in Hernandez v.
Commissioner,273 the Supreme Court extended Lee to the federal income tax,
concluding it was "of no consequence" that "these cases involve federal income
tax, not the Social Security system. 274 Again, the Court stated that "myriad
exceptions" could not be accommodated.275
This same analysis was imported into the RFRA cases. Recall Goehring v.
Brophy,276 in which students who opposed abortion on religious grounds requested
exemptions from otherwise-mandatory student fees because those fees helped to
subsidize a university health care system that paid for abortions.2r The Ninth
Circuit held that RFRA did not require these exemptions. Pointing to Lee, among
other cases, the court concluded that "the fiscal vitality of the University's fee
system would be undermined if the plaintiffs in the present case were exempted
from paying a portion of their student registration fee on free exercise grounds.
Mandatory uniform participation by every student is essential to the insurance
system's survival., 27 The court analogized to a case in which claimants who
269 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
270 Id. at 255.
271 Id. at 257.
272 Id. at 259-60.
273 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
274 Id. at 700; see also Droz v. Commissioner, 48 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1995) (evaluating the
government's compelling interest in maintaining an exemption-free social security system); Kennedy v.
Rubin, No. C 95-1270 SBA, 1995 WL 552148 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 1995) (exemption-free tax system).
275 490 U.S. at 699-700 (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 260).
276 94 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1996).
277 See id. at 1298. See generally supra text accompanying notes 196-205 (discussing Goehring in the
context of the compelling interest test).
278 94 F.3d at 1301 (citing Lee, 455 U.S. at 258).
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opposed war on religious grounds unsuccessfully sought tax exemptions equal to
the portion of their taxes that would support the Vietnam War:
[I]f every citizen could refuse to pay all or part of his taxes on
religious grounds, the government's ability to function would be
severely impaired or destroyed because there are few, if any,
governmental activities to which one person or another would not
object. This logic applies to the facts of the present case as well.
If the students at the University could refuse to pay a portion of
their registration fee on religious grounds, the University's fee
system would be seriously undermined. There are few, if any,
University funded activities to which one student or another
would not object 9
This is a puzzling bit of logic. As a threshold matter, it is unclear that so many
students would object to so many university activities. But even if these myriad
objections did arise, it is unclear that such objections would be relevant here.
RFRA speaks only to religiously-motivated objections. 280 It is irrelevant for an
analysis of RFRA that some student would object to nearly every student activity,
unless such objections were motivated by religion. In other words, there is a clear
limit to the slippery slope suggested by the court.
2 81
But even assuming a flood of religiously-motivated objections, it seems
curious to insulate the university from attack on the grounds that its policies will
create too many burdens on religion. Indeed, in cases like Goehring, exemptions for
religious claimants could serve as an ideal form of less restrictive means. That case
concerned the health insurance system at the University of California at Davis, a
university of approximately 25,000 students.2u Insurance systems, of course,
distribute risk and cost across populations, rather than concentrating them in
279 Id at 1301-02 (citation omitted).
280 See Berg, supra note 49, at 40 ("Because the government must show it is pursuing the 'least
restrictive means' to its end, the government's interests must generally be examined 'at the margin;' that is by
the harm from exempting religious objectors alone."); Clark, supra note 177, at 331 ("The importance of a
law should be measured not by all the benefits it confers on society, but by the incremental benefit of
applying it to those with religious scruples."); Pepper, supra note 184, at 311 ("[Hlarm to governmental
interests must be measured at the margin-the effect of excepting religious claimants from the legal provision
at issue is the measure, not the importance of the provision in general.").
281 See generally Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. Ray. 361,376 (1985):
[T]he slippery slope claim may be premised on something more than undifferentiated
risk aversion. Some subjects may involve a greater than normal likelihood of mistakes..
. A slippery slope claim implicitly or explicitly urges that the instant case distorts or
skews the normal risk functions so that the descent from this decision to the danger case
may be more slippery than the normal passage from one case to the next.
282 See U.C. DAVIS, CHARACTERISTICS OF STUDENTS ENROLLED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA, DAVIS (1996), (last modified May 9, 1997)
<http.//www.sariweb.ucdavis.edu/prafilelprofile96/page3.html#eth>.
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unfortunate individuals. 283 One wonders whether removing religious adherents
from this insurance pool would significantly increase costs for other participants.
Nowhere did the Goehring court consider this question.
Moreover, even assuming that religious exemptions would lead to
substantially higher insurance rates, these exemptions might nonetheless be
appropriate. Particularly if granting these exemptions would not seriously
undermine the university's stated interests, an indirect subsidy for religious free
exercise might mediate between undermining religious freedom and the state's
policy objectives.8 4 When dealing with administrative bureaucracies, it is no
answer to summarily conclude that it might be expensive to monitor exemptions. In
many of these cases, as the courts noted, exceptions already existed.28 5 Why not
allow these exceptions?
Furthermore, contrary to what the Goehring court seemed to suggest, one
could argue that this is no "subsidy" at all. The mere fact that exemptions would
lead to an increased regulatory cost-whether presumed, as in Hernandez, Lee, and
Goehring, or actually demonstrated-does not mean that this is a "subsidy." As
Cass Sunstein has observed, "[t]he notion of subsidy is of course incoherent
without a baseline from which to make a measurement." 286 To term this exemption
a "subsidy" begs the question of the appropriate baseline of funding by assuming
that funding is inappropriate. But why should the assumption be that the religious
claimant, rather than the government or the polity, assume extra costs occasioned
by religious practice? Indeed, it could be argued that this assumption is at the core
of the distinction between Employment Division v. Smith and the compelling
interest test enacted by RFRA. Whereas Smith held that incidental burdens on
religion were constitutionally permissible,28 7 Sherbert v. Verner - the case that
instituted the compelling interest test upon which RFRA was modeled - held that
incidental burdens on religious free exercise were impermissible penalties. 288 Smith
upheld neutral laws of general applicability; Sherbert put them to heightened
scrutiny. In light of this vigorous debate, it is troubling that the Goehring court
assumed without discussion that the claimants should bear the burden of additional
cost. And in light of RFRA's stated goal of restoring Sherbert, it appears to be the
283 See generally GUIDO CALABRESi, THE CosTs OF ACCIDENTS 39-67 (1970) (discussing "loss
spreading").
284 Although my phraseology invites an Establishment Clause objection, no court has held that
religious exemptions violate the Establishment Clause. Indeed, it seems paradoxical to conclude that making
religious practice more expensive is appropriate under the Free Exercise Clause while simultaneously
concluding that making it less expensive would be inappropriate under the Establishment Clause.
285 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1982) (detailing exceptions to the social
security system for self-employed Amish).
288 Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 876 (1987).
287 See Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) ("It is a permissible reading of the text [of the First
Amendment]... to say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion... is not the object of the [regulation] but
merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has
not been offended.").
288 See 374 U.S. 398,403-04 (1963).
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wrong result.
V. CONCLUSION
The promise of RFRA was that it would mark a sea change in the
protection of religious freedom. It was touted as the answer to the crisis of religious
liberty brought on by Employment Division v. Smith. But it was not-to be. As a
threshold matter, Smith did not affect free exercise cases as much as had been
anticipated. The pre-Smith compelling interest test was not particularly friendly to
religious free exercise, so the new Smith test lowered the bar less than it otherwise
would have, and RFRA's restoration of pre-Smith strict scrutiny accomplished less
than it otherwise might have.
But apart from this free-floating analysis of tiers of scrutiny, it is essential
to examine what happened under RFRA. It was said from the start that for RFRA to
succeed, the statute must have symbolic value above and beyond the formal test
that it sought to implement. It must be perceived as a congressional attempt to
reinvigorate the protection of religion. The results of the RFRA cases suggest that
no such reinvigoration occurred, and that no such symbolic message was received.
True, a few courts went far in protecting free exercise,' 8' sometimes in the face of
biting criticism.29° But this was the exception, not the rule. The bulk of RFRA
results were in the other direction. Thin definitions of burdens, thick definitions of
interests, and no apparent consideration of least restrictive means combined to gut
the statute that was meant to resurrect the protection of free exercise. While it is
difficult to speculate why this came about-the potential unconstitutionality of
RFRA? ' institutional uncertainty brought about by rapid changes in the free
exercise test?9 judges' own preferences for the "banquet religions"?---it
289 See, e.g., Cheemav. Thompson, 67 F_3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding the right of a Sikh child to
bring a kirpan-a ceremonial dagger-to school, provided that it was sewn into a sheath, worn under his
clothes, and subject to inspection). See generally Amajeet S. Bhachu, Note, A Shield for Swords, 34 AM.
CalM. L. REV. 197 (1996) (discussing Cheema).
290 In an opinion piece published in the Washington limes, an attorney criticizing Cheema began with
the following sarcastic questions: "What next? Child adherents of the Hezbollah incarnadine version of the
Koran and Sharia law brandishing Katusha rockets at school as a testament to their religious devotion to
capturing Jerusalem and its sacred Mosques under the aegis of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act?"
Bruce Fein, Religious Freedom's Cutting Edge, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1994, at A16. But cf Gurmit Singh
Aulakh, We Cannot Ask Schoolchildren To Check Their Religious Rights at the Door, WASH. TIMEs, Sept.
20, 1994, at A18 (responding to Fein's editorial, the President of the Council of Khalistan writes in favor of
the Cheema decision).
291 Academic articles challenged RFRA's constitutionality from the outset See Christopher L.
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437
(1994); Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox Into the Henhouse
Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CAiDozo L. REv. 357 (1994). Litigants took up
the same argument within months after the Act's passage. See, e.g., Alameen v. Coughlin, 892 F. Supp. 440,
443 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
292 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword:
Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994) (discussing the role of institutional dynamics in statutory
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remains clear that few religious plaintiffs won under RFRA. The attempted
political signal was lost, and with it, the goals of RFRA and its supporters.
interpretation).
293 I borrow this term from Judge Guido Calabresi, who uses it to refer to religions that are
sufficiently ensconced in society's mainstream that their religious leaders are permitted to deliver the
benediction at public banquets. Of course, this refers generally to Catholics, Jews, and certain groups of
Protestants. These religions dominate the federal judiciary. From President Roosevelt to the present, 50%/-
85% of every president's appointees have been Protestant, 100/-30% Catholic, and 2%-18% Jewish. See
SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGEs-LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH
REAGAN 348-50, 354-56 (1997); Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76
JUDICATURE 282 (1993). Indeed, from President Truman to the present, no more than 4% of judicial
appointees have fallen into Goldman's catch-all "other" category, and even those appointees are not far
outside of the religious mainstream--they have been Mormon or Baha'i, rather than adherents of Wicca, the
white separatist Church of Jesus Christ Christian, or the Moorish Science Church.
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